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THE ESSENTIAL UNITY OF SHAREHOLDERS
AND THE MYTH OF INVESTOR SHORT-TERMISM
BY GEORGE W. DENT, JR.*
ABSTRACT

The separation of ownership and control publicized by Berle and
Means in 1932 persists today. Domination of public companies by self
serving and ineffective executives costs America billions of dollars eve1y
year and contributed to the current economic meltdown. Repeated efforts to
solve this problem-including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, expanded disclosure
duties, and more stringent requirements for director independence-have
had little benefit and have sometimes made matters worse. The .flaws in our
corporate governance system are a growing problem for America's economy
as disillusioned investors increasingly place their capital in other countries.
Nonetheless, proposals for greater shareholder power have encountered
criticisms: various shareholders have conj?icting goals; shareholders favor
a short-term perspective at the expense of the long-term health of companies; and shareholders lack the knowledge needed to play a positive
leading role in c01porate governance.
This article refutes these charges. It shows that the objections to
shareholder power are greatly exaggerated, often contradict elementmy
economic principles, and have no empirical basis; they are myths. The
article delves into the latest research in financial economics to demonstrate
that greater shareholder power is associated with better C07porate performance in all respects, including those respects in which critics charge that
shareholder influence would be detrimental.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1932 Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means published The Modern
Corporation and Private Property, which revealed to the hitherto unsuspecting public that public corporations are not controlled by their
supposed owners-the shareholders-but by their top managers-the
supposed agents and fiduciaries of the shareholders. 1 In the next two years,
provoked by the stock market crash of 1929 and the onset of the Great
Depression, Congress held hearings on the operations of the securities
markets and the governance of public corporations. 2
Congress learned, as Berle and Means had revealed that shareholders
typically did not control public companies and that the managers who ran
them often flouted the interests of shareholders and acted to enrich
themselves instead. In theory, shareholders could, and should, have wielded

1

See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARD!NER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRlVATE PROPERTY 129 (rev. ed. Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1968) (1932).
1
See Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.) and S. Res. 56 and S.
Res. 97 Before the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong. (1934); Stock Exchange
Regulation: Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 73d Cong. (1934).
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control through their power to elect the corporation's directors. Flaws in the
proxy voting system, however, enabled insiders to twist it to their own
benefit. To remedy this evil, Congress adopted the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, which created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
authorized it to adopt proxy voting rules that would institute "fair corporate
3
suffrage. "
The SEC proxy rules did eliminate many of the worst abuses, but the
ideal of shareholder democracy was never realized. Corporate executives
(especially chief executive officers) still control the proxy system and,
through it, public corporations. 4 One might imagine, then, that the SEC and
the investing public would unite to support changes to make shareholder
democracy a reality. But such changes have not been made and are not in
the works. Not surprisingly, corporate executives relish their power; they do
not want to be compelled to serve shareholder interests rather than their own.
To hang on to power, however, they had to contrive a theory to justifY it and,
correlatively, to explain why shareholder democracy is a bad idea.
This they did. Corporate managers as well as their operatives and
camp followers constructed a theory that shareholder control would not serve
the national interest in economic efficiency; indeed, it would not serve the
interests of shareholders themselves. This theory was articulated in various
ways by many advocates, but its core is that investors are ignorant, that the
goals of various shareholders conflict, and that many or most shareholders
disregard the long-term interests of the corporation and care only about its
short-term performance. According to many of these advocates, investors at
least have enough sense to realize that shareholder democracy would be a
disaster. Consequently, investors gratefully accept impotence and cede

3
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2006)(authorizing the SEC to
adopt rules regulating proxies); see H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 13 (1934) (stating that "[f]air
corporate suffrage is an important right"); see also id. at 14 (stating the goal of "preventing the
recurrence of abuses which have frustrated the free exercise of the voting rights of stockholders").
4
See Brian Cheffms & Steven Bank, Is Berle and Means Really a Myth? 41-49 (ECGI, Law
Working Paper No. 12112009, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=l352605 (finding that
separation of ownership and control persists today). Some scholars believe that CEO power is
declining. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs I (ECGI, Law Working Paper No.
116/2008, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1281516. The cancerous growth of executive compensation casts doubt on that belief. See infra notes 212, 221, 226, 235 and accompanying
text. If any power has been lost by CEOs, it may have shifted to self-serving directors rather than to
shareholders. See Kahan & Rock, supra, at 61-62. Further, any loss of power would seem to be
limited and episodic. In many companies CEOs still wield great power. See infra notes 210-28 and
accompanying text.
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control to the wiser, more prudent managers. If shareholders assert themselves, they only hurt themselves. 5
This article examines this thesis and fmds it wrong. With a few small
exceptions, the interests of shareholders do not conflict but converge on the
goal of maximizing share value. The claim that most investors are shortterm oriented is a myth. Further, although shareholders lack the knowledge
needed to run public companies themselves, they have the ability to select
directors who are qualified to oversee public firms and guide them toward
the maximization of share value. It is only because the rules of corporate
governance make it impractical for shareholders to coordinate that executives retain corporate control through the proxy system. The main arguments
of the corporate establishment against shareholder power are invalid.
Part II of this article describes the claims that the interests ofvarious
investors fundamentally conflict, that many or most investors are short-term
oriented, and that investors are too ignorant to choose good directors. Parts
III, N, and V show why these three claims are false. Part VI discusses the
significance of these facts for corporate governance.
II. THE CASE AGAINST SHAREHOLDER POWER
A. Different Shareholders Have Different Goals

Most experts in corporate law and in financial economics believe that
most shareholders have the same investment goal-to maximize the value of
their stock. 6 Some, however, argue that the goals of shareholders

5

The literature is voluminous. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited
Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REv. 601, 624 (2006) ("[S]hareholders will prefer to
irrevocably delegate decisionmaking authority to some smaller group, as, in the long run, this will
maximize shareholder wealth."); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1737 (2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director
Primacy] (stating that "investors do not value" strong shareholder rights); LynnA. Stout, The
Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REv. 789, 803 (2002) [hereinafter Stout,
Mythical Benefits] (stating that shareholders themselves "prefer weak shareholder rights"); Lynn A.
Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors in Public CO!porations Tolerate Board Governance, !52 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 686 (2003) (stating that shareholders
and nonshareholders prefer arrangements where the board has the discretion to allocate returns).
More recently Lynn Stout argued that "the modern trend toward greater 'shareholder power' has gone
too far and is beginning to harm the very shareholders it was designed to protect." Lynn Stout,
Investors Who Are Too Bolshy for Their Own Good, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 23, 2007, at 9
[hereinafter Stout, Bolshy Investors].
6
"[S]hareholders, as residual claimants, have the greatest incentive to maximize the value of
the firm." Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder Constituencies/rom a Theory ofthe Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1266, 1267-68
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fundamentally conflict in two ways. First, some want only to maximize the
short-term value of the stock, while others want to maximize the long-term
value. This claim will be discussed below. 7
Second, some shareholders do not want to maximize share value
because they have an overriding contradictory interest. 8 These shareholders
include employees, politicized entities, and shareholders who have
investments in two companies with contradictory interests. 9 An employee
(1999); see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 68 (1991) ("As the residual claimants, shareholders have the appropriate
incentives ... to make discretionary decisions .... ");Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 405 (1983) (stating that tl1e preferences of
shareholders "are likely to be similar if not identical"); Paul H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas,
C01porate Voting and the Takeover Debate, 58 V AND. L. REV. 453, 464 (2005) (discussing the
assumption of shareholder homogeneity); E. Han Kim, Corporate Governance and Labor Relations,
21 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 57, 57 (2009) ("Shareholders ... are in the best position to make the
value-maximizing tradeoffs that all companies confront .... "); id. at 58 ("Taking their perspective
ends up increasing the odds that social resources are put to ilieir highest valued uses."); An ant K.
Sundaram & Andrew C. Inkpen, The C01porate Objective Revisited, 15 ORG. SCI. 350, 353 (2004)
("Only residual cash flow claimants have the incentive to maximize the total value of the firm.").
Surprisingly, these experts include some critics of shareholder primacy. See STEPHEN M.
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 469 n.l6 (2002) ("Aliliough investors have
somewhat different preferences on issues such as dividends and the like, they are generally united by
a desire to maximize share value.").
7
See infra notes 19-20, 101-27 and accompanying text.
8
Seelman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiducial]' Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1255, 1287 (2008); lman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power,
53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 577-93 (2006) (alleging various conflicts of interest among shareholders);
Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 5, at 1751, 1754-57 (positing danger of special interest
shareholders); Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in C01porate Lmv: The Role of Shareholder
Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 661 (2006).
[I]nvestors vary considerably among such dimensions as the time frame over which
they invest, the extent to which they trade versus passively holding ilie
corporation's stock, their degree of diversification, ilie extent to which they hold
non-equity interests in the issuer, any option or other hedging positions that they
hold, and so forth.
Id.; see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game Theoretic Approach
to C01porate Law, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 347, 368-70 (1991) (noting shareholder differences overtime
horizons, risk preferences, and expectations for the future); Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum,
Election Contests in the Company's Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 Bus. LAW. 67,
78 (2003) ("[M]any institutional and other activist investors have competing interests iliat may
conflict with ilie best interests of the public corporation and its shareholder body and oilier
constituencies taken as a whole."); Stout, Mythical Benefits, supra note 5, at 794 ("Board power ...
protect[s] shareholders from each other."); Lynn A. Stout, Takeovers in the Ivory Tower: How
Academics Are Leaming Martin Lipton May Be Right, 60 Bus. LAW. 1435, 1447-48 (2005)
(claiming that highly diversified shareholders may oppose share-price maximization in some fmns
because of their interests in others).
9
See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to
Bebchuk's Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1765 (2006)
("[l]nstitutions most inclined to be activist investors are associated with state governments and labor
unions, and often appear to be driven by concerns other than a desire to increase ilie economic
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shareholder almost always has a greater stake in her employee compensation
. than in the value of her stock since most employees own but a tiny fraction
of their employer's stock. Accordingly, employee-shareholders want to
maximize their compensation, even at the cost oflowering the value of their
shares. 10 A large shareholder who is not an employee might also be able to
extract unfair benefits through contracts with the company-i.e., engage in
self-dealing-to the detriment of share value. 11 And some investors are
alleged to have particular goals inimical to the interests of other
shareholders. Hedge funds are sometimes regarded this way. 12
Some shareholders have a political agenda that overrides their desire
to maximize the value of their stock. A public pension or sovereign wealth
fund, for instance, might value the economic interests of its state or local
area and seek to maximize a company's operations in that location at the
expense of share value. 13
performance of the companies in which they invest."); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Investor Activism:
Reshaping the Playing Field? 17 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 08-12,
2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1130969 (stating that union and state and local pension
funds "are precisely the institutions most likely to use their position to self-deal ... or to otherwise
reap private benefits not shared with other investors"); Andrew K. Prevost et aL, Labor Unions as
Shareholder Activists: Champions or Detractors? (May 5, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1119328 (claiming that union pension funds may use the proxy process
to promote their own agendas).
10
See Ashwini K. Agrawal, Co1porate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting 30 (NYU Stem Working Paper Series Paper, No. Fin-08-006,
2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1285084 (presenting "evidence that suggests some labor
union shareholders have board of director voting patterns that partly reflect union workers interests
rather than the objectives of maximizing equity value alone").
11
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Comment on the SEC Shareholder Access Proposal12-13
(UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 03-22, 2003), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=470 121. "[I]nstitutional investors may abuse their control by self-dealing and other forms
of over-reaching.... If the board becomes more beholden to the interests of large shareholders, it
may become less concerned with the welfare of smaller investors." !d.
12
See Jeffrey H. Ballabon, Sovereign Wealth, Private Equity, and Hedge Funds . .. Oh lvfy,
9 ENGAGE 25, 26 (2008) ("Hedge funds also are the pariahs of the capital markets."); Andrew M.
Kulpa & Butzel Long, The Wolf in Shareholder's Clothing: Hedge Fund Use ofCooperative Game
Theory and Voting Structures to Exploit Co1porate Control and Governance, 6 U.C. DAVIS Bus.
L.J. 4, 4 (2005); Strine, supra note 9, at 1764; Memorandum from Martin Lipton eta!. to Clients, Be
Prepared for Attacks by Hedge Funds (Dec. 21, 2005) (on file with author).
13
See MICHAEL T. JACOBS, SHORT-TERM AMERICA: THE CAUSES AND CURES OF OUR
BUSINESS MYOPIA 53 (1991) (stating that public pension fund trustees are mostly political
appointees with their own "political agendas"); Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in
Co1porate Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 795-96 (1993 ); Roberta Romano,
Getting Politics out of Public Pension Funds, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE, Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 42;
Roberta Romano, The Politics ofPublic Pension Funds, PUB. INT., Spring 1995, at 42. Pension
fund managers lack incentives to maximize share value because their compensation is not directly
tied to fund performance and, unlike mutual fund holders, dissatisfied beneficiaries cannot switch to
another fund. See infra notes 35-42 and accompanying text (concerning fears of sovereign wealth
funds).
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Oflate, some commentators have raised alarms about another kind of
shareholder who does not want to maximize the value of a company's
equity--one who has a larger investment in other securities, the value of
which varies inversely with that of the company's equity. The other securities could be issued by the same company. For example, a shareholder
who has a larger stake in the same company's debt securities might oppose
potentially profitable but risky projects that would increase the value of the
common stock but diminish the value of the debt.
The conflicting interest could also be in another company. An investtor who owns stock in competing firms might seek to hinder the one in
which she holds the smaller interest in order to benefit the other. For instance, if an investor owned stock in both companies in a proposed merger
that promises to benefit one company but will be unprofitable for the other,
that investor might favor the one in which she holds the larger interest, to the
detriment ofthe other.
A related charge is that some shareholders do not want to maximize
the value of the equity because they are risk averse. People are often risk
averse. Most homeowners buy home insurance even though the premiums
on the policy exceed the benefits, because most people would rather incur
that small loss than risk devastation from an uninsured loss of their home.
Most investors (or, at least, most with substantial investments) are risk
averse with regard to their portfolios, and they grow more cautious as they
approach retirement. They may oppose corporate endeavors with positive
net present value that pose a risk of a large loss even though risk-neutral
shareholders would favor such projects.
An obvious problem with these scenarios is that resolutions presented
to shareholders generally require a majority vote, with shareholders having
one vote per share. Accordingly, it would seem that shareholders will act to
maximize the value of the stock unless those with a conflicting interest own
a majority of the equity. This prospect alone is still disturbing-it raises the
possibility that a minority might be victimized by a majority holding a
conflicting interest.
More disturbing is that shareholders with a conflict of interest might
alter the voting result without owning a majority of the equity. A supermajority is sometimes required for shareholder action/ 4 so that a minority
might be able to veto action that would enhance the stock price. Some
companies have two classes of common stock with equal fmancial rights but

14
See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 646 (2000) (stating that "some statutes
contain a more traditional supermajority requirement" for shareholder approval of statutory mergers).
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different voting rights ("dual class stock"), 15 so that a minority fmancial
interest could thwart action to raise the value of the stock.
Supermajority voting and dual class capitalization must be fixed in a
company's charter; they cannot be instituted by a single minority shareholder. Even without these provisions, however, a shareholder may be able
to acquire voting power beyond her equity interest. For instance, an investor
can simultaneously buy a block of a company's stock and sell an equal block
short by borrowing such a block and promptly selling it. The investor could
then vote the shares actually purchased while holding a zero net interest in
the company's equity. This decoupling of the voting and economic rights of
stock has been dubbed "empty voting. " 16 Its limited use has led to cries of
alarm. 17
Sometimes shareholders can also vote stock they do not own. Voting
rights are established as of the "record date," which is usually thirty to sixty
days before the shareholder meeting. 18 A record date owner can sell the
stock between the record and meeting dates and still be able to vote the stock
she no longer owns.

B. Shareholders Are Short-Term Oriented
Some critics of shareholder power charge that many shareholders are
"short-term oriented." Martin Lipton and Steven Rosenblum say that some
shareholders "may seek to push the corporation into steps designed to create
a short-term pop in the company's share price so that they can tum a quick
19
profit." The Aspen Institute's Corporate Values Strategy Group, comprised

15

See DALE A. OESTERLE, MERGERS AND ACQUIS!TIONS IN A NUTSHELL 263-64 (2d ed.

2006).

See Henry T .C. H u & Bernard Black, E qui~v and Debt Decoupl ing and Empty Voting II:
Importance and Extensions, !56 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 661-81 (2008) (listing more than eighty events
of decoupling around the world); Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Hedge Funds, Insiders, and the
Decoupling ofEconomic and Voting Ownership: Empty Voting and Hidden (M01phable) Ownership, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 343 (2007); see also Susan E.K. Christoffersen et a!., Vote Trading and
Information Aggregation, 62 J. FIN. 2897, 2908-09 (2007) (discussing the variations of votetrading); Frank S. Partnoy & Randall S. Thomas, Gap Filling, Hedge Funds, and Financial
Innovation 39-40 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch., Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 06-21, 2006),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=931254 (discussing merger and risk arbitrage in regards to
16

hedge funds).
17

See Anabtawi, supra note 8, at 591-92; Stout, Mythical Benefits, supra note 5, at 794-95.
For discussion of these cases, see infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
18
See GEVURTZ, supra note 14, at 203 (explaining the operation of record dates).
19
Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 8, at 78; see Patrick Bolton et al., Pay for Short-Term
Pe!formance: Executive Compensation in Speculative Markets, 30 J. CORP. L. 721, 725 (2005)
(alleging a conflict between current shareholders who profit from "earnings manipulation" and future
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of prominent corporations, institutional investors, labor organizations, and
professionals, has voiced "concern about excessive short-term pressures in
today's capital markets that result from intense focus on quarterly earnings
and incentive structures that encourage corporations and investors to pursue
short-term gain with inadequate regard to long-term effects. "2 Certainly
many investors hold stocks briefly, but how does this behavior affect
corporate governance now, or how could it do so under a system of
shareholder primacy? That question will be discussed below. 21

°

C. Shareholders Are Uninformed
Some opponents of shareholder primacy contend that investors are
22
uninformed. Further, because investors are uninformed and irrational,
capital markets are inefficient. 23
ill. THE FUNDAMENTAL UNITY OF SHAREHOLDER INTERESTS

A mass of evidence shows that shareholders are fundamentally unified
behind the goal of maximizing the value of the equity. 24 The exceptions to

shareholders); William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side ofShareholder Value, 76 TuL. L. REv.
1275, 1284 (2002) (stating that shareholder value maximization has resulted in an obsession with
"short-term performance numbers"); Strine, supra note 9, at 1764 (discussing the increasing sway of
institutional investors over corporations and focus on quarter-to-quarter earnings, leading to
corporate debacles); Lynn A. Stout, Why Carl !calm Is Bad for Investors, WALL Sr. 1., Aug. I,
2008, at All (stating that "activist" shareholders are usually short-termers).
20
THE ASPEN lNST., LONG-TERM VALUE CREATION: GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR CORPORATIONS AND INVESTORS 2 (2007), available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/atf/cf/%7BDEB
6F227-659B-4EC8-8F84-8DF23CA 704F5% 7D/Fina!Principles.pdf[hereinafter ASPEN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES]; see also THE ASPEN lNST., OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL
FORA MORE RESPONSffiLE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 2-3 (2009),
available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/business%20and%20
society"lo2dprograrnlovercome_short_state0909 .pdf (alleging "shareholder short-termism").
21
See infra Part N.
22
See Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at
Work, 13 STAN. J.L Bus. & FIN. 334, 335 (2008) (arguing that a benefit of employee primacy is
that employees "know much that absentee shareholders do not know"); Bainbridge, supra note II, at
13 ("Shareholders have neither the information nor the incentives necessary to make sound decisions
on either operational or policy questions.").
23
See Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms ofMarket Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New
Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 637, 660, 666 (2003); Stout, supra note 8, at 1443 (alleging that
investors are "often driven by emotion and cognitive bias"); Jon E. Hilsenrath, Stock Characters: As
Two Economists Debate Markets, the Tide Shifts; Belief in Efficient Valuation Yields Ground to
Role ofIrrational Investors; Mr. Thaler Takes on Mr. Fama, WALL Sr. J., Oct. 18, 2004, at A1
(comparing the irrationality of some investors with the efficient market hypothesis).
24
See Note, Should the SEC Expand Nonfinancial Disclosure Requirements?, I 15 HARV. L.
REv. 1433, 1437-39 (2002).
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the rule are minor and have no great consequences for corporate governance
policy.
A. Employee Shareholders

Employee shareholders rarely own a large, unified block of stock.
Generally they hold a small minority. Moreover, employees' interests are not
uniform. 25 Even unionized companies (now a small and shrinking part of the
private sector) often have several bargaining units and many employees
(including the managers) who are nonunion. Recognizing that they cannot
prevail without the support of other shareholders, unions have generally
26
backed the same kind of governance reforms that appeal to other investors.
In nonpublic companies, either all the shareholders are employees (so
that there are no nonemployee shareholders) or arrangements are made to
27
protect outside shareholders (such as venture capitalists). These arrangements typically include a major role in corporate governance. 28 Thus, it is
rare that public investors need to worry about abuse of control by employee
shareholders, and these few cases can be resolved by specially negotiated
agreements. 29
B. Political Shareholders
Shareholders who prefer some political agenda to the maximization of
share value are also a minor problem. Rarely do such investors own more

25

See McDonnell, supra note 22, at 350.
_
See Paolo Santella et a!., A Comparative Analysis of the Legal Obstacles to Institutional
Investor Activism in Europe and in the US 12 (July 2, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
26

http://ssm.com/abstract=1137491 (citing information provided to the authors by Capital International).
27
See George W. Dent, Jr., Venture Capital and the Future of Corporate Finance, 70
WASH. U. L.Q. I 029, 1035-61 (1992)(describing arrangements to protect venture capital investors).
28
ld at 1035-44.
29
Critics of shareholder primacy sometimes point to cases where unions have exploited SEC
rule 14a-8 to make shareholder proposals that would benefit employees at the expense of public
shareholders. See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Should Labor Be Allowed to Make
Shareholder Proposals?, 73 WASH. L. REV. 41, 61-63 (1998) (describing the use of rule 14a-8 by
labor unions against companies with which the union has collective bargaining or wage disputes or
workplace grievances). Perhaps the rule should be revised to spare companies the costs of such
abuses of the rule, but proposals to change the rule have not been implemented and the rule does not
materially affect corporate governance. See id. at 44 (leading to the conclusion, in an empirical
study, that "shareholders will vote in their own self-interest, and, if they believe that labor is acting
against their interests, they will vote against labor's proposals").
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30

than a small fraction of a company's shares. The peculiar agendas of these
investors also tend to cancel out one another. Taking the example of public
pension funds again, the interest of each fund in favoring its home region
would be offset by the interests of other public pension funds that favor their
homes. It is unlikely that their interests would converge and that they would
own enough stock to divert any public company from maximizing share
value.
Similarly, social activist investors who have political goals (e.g.,
animal welfare or pollution reduction) own but a small fraction of all
investment capital, 31 and that is unlikely to change soon. Further, these
investors may not stray far from the principle of profit maximization. Some
studies show that the stocks of"socially responsible" companies outperform
the market. 32 The interests of these funds may also clash with each other or
with those of other shareholders. For example, employees and unions at
many manufacturing and natural resource companies oppose the agenda of
environmental activists. Thus, it seems improbable that social activists could
substantially impair the efforts of public companies to maximize share value.
Concern is now rising over one kind of politically motivated investor:
sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). 33 Although government-conh·olled investtors are not new, anxieties have increased recently because of the rapid
growth of these funds, and because many have now abandoned their

30
See Damon A. Silvers & Michael I. Garland, The Origins and Goals of the Fight for
Proxy Access I 5- I 6 (2004), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dir-nominations/silversgarland022004.pdf
(finding that in a survey of eight large public companies, a union or public pension fund did not own
more than 1% of the company's stock).
31
See Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the False Promise
ofShareholder Homogeneity, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 445,496 (2008) ("Socially responsible investing is just a small share of the market now.").
32
Greg Filbeck et al., T11e "Best Corporate Citizens": Are They Good for Their
Shareholders?, 44 FIN. REv. 239, 260 (2009); Laura Poddi & Sergio Vergalli, Does C01porate
Social Responsibility Affect the Pe1jormance afFirms? 34 (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Working
Paper No. 52.2009, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=l444333. Other studies have
shown that "socially responsible" investment funds match or outperform other mutual funds. E.g.,
Sally Hamilton et al., Doing Well While Doing Good? T11e Investment Pe1jormance of Socially
Responsible Mutual Funds, 49 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 62, 64-66 (1993); Steve Schueth, Socially
RespollSible Investing in the United States, 43 J. Bus. Ennes 189, 192-93 (2003); Meir Statrnan,
Socially Responsible Mutual Funds, 56 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 30, 34 (2000). Neither fmding is surprising-in an efficient market in which many investors care about "social responsibility" and many
do not (or there is substantial disagreement about the meaning of"social responsibility"), one would
expect that returns to stocks of "socially responsible" companies and mutual funds would be the
same.
33
The defmition of SWF is somewhat vague. See Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt,
Sovereign FVealth Funds and C01porate Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Merchantilism I 3 (Stanford Univ. Law & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 355, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=I095023 (listing different entities that might be considered SWFs).
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traditional limitation to debt securities and begun to make large purchases of
equities. 34 The main fear is that these funds will act for political reasons and
not to maximize share value. 35 A second concern is that SWFs may use their
influence to engage in industrial espionage. 36
The first response to these fears is that they seem exaggerated. So far,
SWFs appear interested only in maximizing their profits, not in political
manipulation or espionage. 37 The interest of other shareholders is to oppose
any pressure by SWFs (or any other investor) on portfolio companies to act
for political reasons or to submit to espionage if so doing would lower share
value. Such pressures should, then, be effective only if an S WF (or a group
of affiliated SWFs) acquired a majority of the stock of a public company. In
that case, however, the SWF would also bear most of the resulting loss in
share value.
It is highly unlikely that an SWF could attain such control. Federal
law requires review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States (CFIDS) of any acquisition of foreign control over a U.S. company,
and CFIUS can recommend that the President block an acquisition if it poses
a threat to national security. 38 For purposes of this law, "control" is defined

34

See id. at4, 12-17.
See James Politi, Sovereign Funds Face US Threat, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 14, 2008,
at 8 (quoting Senator Charles Schumer).
36
Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 33, at 9, 21; see Don Clark & Chip Cummins, AlvlD's
Infusion from Emirate May Only Be Respite, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2007, at A3; Richard Wray,
Abu Dhabi B!IYS into US Chip Firm, GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 19, 2007, at 27, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2007/nov/19/2.
37
Recently, three academic experts on SWFs testifying before Congress agreed that "these
foreign government investments in the United States should not be feared. Sovereign wealth funds,
while expanding rapidly, are largely benign as the majority of them are interested in maximizing
profits rather than advancing geopolitical agendas .... Further, they provide necessary economic
benefits." Aaron Lorenzo, International Developments: Vet Sovereign Wealth Funds When
Sensitive Sectors Involved, Senate Panel Told, 40 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 940 (June 16, 2008)
(summarizing testimony by Professors Jagdish Bhagwati and David Marchiclc of Columbia and
Professor Daniel Drezner of Tufts). A recent review concludes:
At least to date, SWFs have acted as model investors and have not sought to
leverage their position to pursue political ends. That ... is not surprising: SWFs
have strong natural incentives to avoid being perceived as strategic investors, so as
to avoid a public backlash that could compromise their continued access to
Western markets .... In our view, it would be a mistake to discourage SWFs from
investing in the United States by imposing on them any additional regulations at
this time .... When SWFs buy a stake in a US company, they also buy a stake in
our domestic welfare. That's an investment we ought to welcome with open arms,
not one to burden unnecessarily.
Richard A. Epstein & Amanda M. Rose, The Regulation ofSovereign Wealth Funds: The Virtues of
Going Slow, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. Ill, 134 (2009).
38
Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, sec. I,
35
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very broadly. 39 The Treasury Department recently proposed rules that would
require review of acquisitions below 10% of a company's stock. 40 So far,
problems "have not materialized in any appreciable way. "41
If, however, existing safeguards eventually prove inadequate, specific
further steps can be taken. One recent proposal would strip SWFs of voting
rights in public companies. 42 Certainly, whatever dangers are posed by
SWFs, the solution is not to weaken shareholder power generally.
C. Shareholders Who Do Business with the Company
Fears of self-dealing by institutional investors43 are also overblown,
especially in light of the actual current problems of self-dealing by dominant
managers and their friends. Managers must be compensated; the proper
level of compensation is the only issue. By contrast, most institutional investors (mutual funds, pension funds, and hedge funds) have few opportunities to contract with the companies in which they invest. Any effort
to create such contracts would draw attention and opposition from managers,
analysts, and other investors.
Second, CEOs always influence, and usually dominate, the outside
directors. 44 By contrast, public shareholders usually have little influence on
the selection or behavior of directors. They cannot place nominees for the
board, or even proposals for bylaws that would allow them to place
nominees for the board, on the company's proxy statement. 45 A fortiori, a
single, outside shareholder rarely has much influence on board
§ 72l{b), sec. 6, § 721(d)(l), 121 Stat. 246,246-48,255 (codified at 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170).
39
See id sec. 2, § 721(a){l).
40
See Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions and Takeovers by Foreign Persons,
73 Fed. Reg. 21,861, 21,864-73 (proposed Apr. 23, 2008).
41
Ballabon, supra note 12, at 25.
42
Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 33, at 10,21-30.
43
See supra note II and accompanying text.
44
See infra notes 209-18 and accompanying text.
45
1ndeed, the SEC amended rule 14a-8(i)(8) to overturn the decision in American
Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. American International Group, Inc., 462
F.3d 121 {2d Cir. 2006), which required the company to include in its proxy statement a shareholder
proposal to amend the company's bylaws to permit inclusion of shareholder nominees in the
company's future proxy statements in certain circumstances. See Shareholder Proposals Relating to
the Election of Directors, 72 Fed. Reg. 70,450 (Dec. 11, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
Moreover, although shareholders can propose bylaws that otherwise alter the ground rules
for proxy voting, the resulting bylaws may not be binding on the board. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME
Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 235, 239-40 (Del. 2008) (holding that although a shareholder-proposed bylaw that required reimbursement of a shareholder's proxy expenses in certain
circumstances was a proper subject for shareholder action, it would not bind the board if it required
the board to take action inconsistent with its fiduciary duties); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112
(2008) (codifying this rule).
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composition. 46 If an outsider could sneak a friend onto the board, any effort
to exploit that contact would be obvious to managers and other outside
directors and investors, who have no reason to tolerate any action that
47
reduces the value of their stock. Despite the expressed fears of self-dealing
by institutional investors, no actual incidents of its occurrence with investment funds have come to light.
A few institutional investors do contract with public companies. The
trust department of a bank, for example, may own a company's stock in trust
while the commercial side of the bank seeks the company's banking
business. A "Chinese wall" between the two departments is supposed to
prevent the commercial division from pressuring the trust department, but
there are doubts about how effective these "walls" are. 48 Such situations,
however, pose little threat that a bank will exploit its stock ownership to
extract unusual terms from the company in its commercial banking. Indeed,
49
such situations may do more damage to the bank than to the company.
If self-dealing by institutional investors who can influence board
elections was a lucrative possibility we would have observed it already. That
is, if the ten or twenty largest institutional shareholders of a company could
profit by choosing directors who would then grant them preferential
contracts, we should already discern such activity, at least occasionally. In
fact, we do not. The reasons for this are not hard to guess. Even the ten or
twenty largest institutional shareholders rarely own anything approaching a
majority of a company's stock. Any attempt to implement such a scheme
should be evident to other shareholders. If it were not noticed by outsiders,
managers would have an incentive to reveal it. The other shareholders
would then squelch the scheme.

46
There are a few exceptions, but they tend to prove the rule. For example, management
resisting a takeover may issue a large block of stock to a "white squire." See OESTERLE, supra note
15, at 267 (describing this and related practices). In that case, though, the shareholder agrees to be
an ally of the insiders.
47
See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 244-45 (1994) (stating that multiple intermediaries can form
"countercoalition[s] ").
48
See EdwardS. Herman & Carl F. Safanda, The Commercial Bank Trust Department and
the "Wall," 14 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 21, 27-28 (1973); Joao A.C. Santos & Adrienne S.
Rumble, The American Keiretsu and Universal Banks: Investing, Voting and Sitting on Nonfinancials' C01porate Boards, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 419, 421 (2006).
49
See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
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D. Shareholders with Conflicting Investments
The problem of shareholder action that reduces (or the obstruction of
action that enhances) share value, by shareholders who have a minority
equity interest and a larger conflicting interest (so-called "empty voting"), is
50
also much exaggerated. And to the extent that the problem exists, it argues
for more shareholder power, not less.
Although it is theoretically possible for an investor to acquire voting
rights considerably greater than her equity stake, even without dual class
stock, 5 1 the obstacles are formidable. The quantity of stock available for
such schemes is small. 52 Lenders of stock charge a fee to the borrower, and
when the fee is set, the lender can weigh the risk that the borrower wm act to
diminish the stock's value. 53 Fees charged now may not reflect much of a
risk, but that is because such ploys have been extremely rare. If they proliferate, fees will rise.
The occurrence of empty voting in a few cases has precipitated the
sounding of tocsins/ 4 but even these exceptions have proved the rule.
Mylan Labs' proposed acquisition of King Pharmaceuticals was fought by an
investor that held voting rights for many shares of Mylan, but had hedged
away all its economic interest in the stock while holding a big equity stake in
King. 55 This investor was sued by another Mylan shareholder, but the case

50
See generally Jarrad Harford eta!., Conflicts ofInterests Among Shareholders: 177e Case
ofCorporate Acquisitions 1, 4-5 (MlT Sloan Sch., Working Paper No. 4653-07, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=947596 (discussing cares and concerns of "shareholder cross-holdings").
See also authorities cited infra note 61 (questioning whether empty voting is a significant problem).
Henry Hu and Bernard Black say: "Debt and hybrid decoupling can potentially produce valuedecreasing outcomes at particular companies." Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Debt and Hybrid
Decoupling: An Overview, M&A LAW, Apr. 2008, at 5. They offer no instances, however, where
such effects have occurred, and they concede that debt decoupling has "positive aspects" that are
"well known" and that its "benefits may well exceed the costs." /d. at 5, 9.
51
"Shareholders can do it simply by using calls and puts to create synthetic stocks and take
long or short positions in them." Avner Kalay & Shagun Pant, One Share-One Vote is Unenforceable and Sub-optimal 2 (Oct. 2008) (EFA 2008 Athens Meetings Paper), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract= I I 02832. Thus vote shifting cannot be prevented in a market system. See
id. at 8-10.
52
See Dale A. Oesterle, Regulating Hedge Funds, I ENTREPRENEURJAL Bus. L.J. I, 25-26
(2006) ("[O]nly a small percentage of most common stock is available to be borrowed and an
investor will be inherently limited by the supply.").
53
Jd. at 27-28'. Of course, the lender will weigh only its own potential losses. Thus, the fee
will not impound the potential losses of other shareholders. But for the borrower to have a substantial effect on the outcome of the vote, it will have to acquire voting rights to a large number of
shares. So, the fee could be large.
54
See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
55
See High River Ltd. P'ship v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 2d 487, 490 (M.D. Pa.
2005).
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was rendered moot when Mylan abandoned the proposed acquisition of
Kin g. 56
Similarly, in JP Morgan's takeover of Bear Stearns, some of Bear's
creditors bought its stock in order to vote for the merger because .JP Morgan
had promised to pay Bear's debt. 57 Presumably due in part to these purchases, the price of Bear's stock rose above the initially proposed acquisition
price of $2 per share. Simultaneously, other investors who had short
positions in Bear's debt were reported to have bought shares in order to vote
against the merger so as to push Bear into bankruptcy, thereby raising the
value of their shoti positions. 58
Despite these machinations, the outcome was reassuring. JP Morgan
raised its offer to $10 per share, and the merger was approved. Those who
shorted the debt and voted against the merger lost. Bear's creditors who
bought its stock and voted for the merger won, but that was hardly a defeat
for the "pure" shareholders of Bear. There was considerable doubt whether
even JP Morgan's initial offer of $2 per share was excessive-again, those
who shorted Bear's debt believed that abandonment of the merger would
lead to Bear's bankruptcy. Nonetheless, purchases of Bear's stock by investtors with both long and short positions in its debt helped to raise the stock's
price over the $2 bid, and thus may have helped induce JP Morgan to raise
its bid to $10. No one even hinted at offering more, and Bear's shareholders
overwhelmingly approved the merger. Thus it seems that Bear's pure
shareholders were not harmed but rather benefitted greatly from the
"decoupling" ploys.
In short, "stock lending[] is to an important degree self-policing." 59
Despite the scholarly jeremiads over empty voting, 60 it has never yet altered
the result of a shareholder vote, and problems from it are likely to remain
rare or nonexistent. 61 In some cases, decoupling could be beneficial, as

56

Hayden & Bodie, supra note 31, at 485.
;?The facts of this event are taken from Hu & Black, supra npte 50, at 4.
58
See Matthew Kamitschnig & David Enrich, Bear's Run-Up Sets the Stage for Epic Clash;
Speculators Ignite Rally, Driving Shares Up 23%; Disbeliefon Deal Price, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19,
2008, at Cl.
59
0esterle, supra note 52, at 25.
60
See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
61
See Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the Ne1v Hedge Fund Activism: An
Empirical Analysis, 32 J. CORP. L. 681, 721 (2007); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge
Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1076 (2007)
(questioning whether empty voting is a significant problem); see also Robert B. Thompson & Paul
H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129, 155 (2009) (noting that "the number of
institutional investors who are unbalanced in-the direction of the target should balance the numbers
who are unbalanced in the direction of the bidder").
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when an activist investor acquires extra voting rights so as to offset the
passivity of other shareholders, the managers' control of the proxy
machinery, or dual class voting where insiders own superior voting stock. 62
One recent analysis concludes that shareholders are better off having "the
ability to dynamically change the voting structure" of their firm. 63
Directors also have some ability to handle problems like empty voting.
In two recent cases, boards postponed scheduled shareholder meetings
because many shares had changed hands after the record date and the new
shareholders wanted to vote their newly acquired shares. Other shareholders
sued, alleging that the boards had breached their fiduciary duties. In both
cases the Delaware Court of Chancery upheld delay as a reasonable response
to the existing conditions. 64 If any danger remains, it can be handled by
tighter mles on short-selling and empty voting. 65 To address the threat by

62

See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Can Borrowing Shares Vindicate Shareholder Primacy?, 42
U.C. DAVJSL. REV. 1231, 1311 (2009) (arguing that a public share borrowing market may improve
the efficiency of shareholder decisionmaking); Hu & Black, supra note 50, at 5 (outlining benefits
of decoupling); Alan Brav & Richmond D. Mathews, Empty Voting and Efficiency of Corporate
Governance 6-7 (Mar. I 0, 2009) (AFA 2009 San Francisco Meetings Paper), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=JJ08632 (presenting a model showing that "empty voting" can improve
overall efficiency); Santella et al., supra note 26, at 33 (stating that perhaps "lenders [of shares] are
not interested in voting and the borrowers make use of the voting rights" but that "separation of risk
from voting rights put in place by managers and controlling shareholders limits investors' activism");
Michael Zurkinden, Corporate Vote Buying: The New Separation of Ownership and Control 33
(Feb. 6, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available athttp://ssm.com/abstract=1338624 ("In general,
the literature dealing with vote buying is rather ambiguous with regard to the desirability of the
phenomenon.... Moreover, vote buying in general is unlikely to be a profitable activist strategy.").
63
Kalay & Pant, supra note 51, at 3 5. The paper focuses primarily on the treatment of target
shareholders in acquisitions. Even assuming that the conclusion is correct in this context, it might
be less true in ordinary circumstance. The paper argues, however, that freedom to shift votes
"increases the market value of the firm." Id at 7. This argues against the charge that investors are
seriously threatened by vote shifting. These problems arise only because "hedge funds are merely
reacting to the failure of other institutions to exercise their franchise for the benefit of all
shareholders." Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 16, at 52.
64
Mercier v. Inter-Tel, Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 819 (Del. Ch. 2007); In re MONY Group, Inc.
S'holder Litig., 853 A.2d 661, 676-77 (Del. Ch. 2004).
65
See, e.g., Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 8, at 1295-96 (advocating application of fiduciary
duties to shareholders with conflicting interests); Briggs, supra note 6I, at 706-08 (urging higher
disclosure requirements); Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting
and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 8I I, 876 (2006) (advocating revised
disclosure requirements); Thompson & Edelman, supra note 6 I, at I 66 (proposing that shareholder
voters be required to "certify that they are voting no more shares than they have economic interests
in"); Jonathan Cohen, Note, Negative Voting: Why It Destroys Shareholder Value and a Proposal to
Prevent It, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 237, 253-57 (2008) (proposing a private right of action by
shareholders harmed by negative voting against the negative voter); David Skeel, Behind the Hedge,
LEGAL AFF ., Nov.-Dec. 2005, at 33 (proposing to "disqualify the votes of any shareholder who had
entered into a contract that protected him from changes in the price of the stock he voted"); Roberta
S. Karmel, Voting Power Without Responsibility or Risk-How Should Proxy Reform Address the
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crippling shareholder suffrage would be truly to throw out the baby with the
bath water.
Another alleged problem is the fully diversified shareholder, or
"universal owner, "66 whose interest is in the entire market and who might,
therefore, oppose measures that would increase the value of its shares in
some companies, but diminish the value of its other investments by a greater
amount. 67 The first problem with this alleged problem is that it probably
does not exist. Even large mutual funds are not so diversified that they are
likely to oppose profitable steps by one portfolio company that would
impose losses on the market generally, and it is unlikely that a profitable act
by one portfolio company would cause a greater loss to another portfolio
company.
If investors were behaving as universal owners, we should have seen
some evidence of it, but none of those who are sounding this alarm offer
such evidence. All the literature I know of on investor voting and corporate
governance (including the pronouncements of investor advisory services),
focuses on individual firms, not on the general market. In short, this alleged
problem seems to be another chimera conjured by academics searching for
something new to write about. But even if the universal owner exists and
behaves as alleged, what threat does he pose? If some universal owners act
in the interest of the entire market, is that not a beneficial market correction
to the problem of externalities in a market system? 68
The one situation that does spawn real abuses ofthis kind is dual class
voting. 69 In these cases, however, the holders of the minority equity stake,
who wield control through high-voting stock, are always insiders, not
Decoupling of Economic and Voting Rights? 5-6 (Brooklyn Law Sch., Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 146, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=l397224 (recommending that the SEC
"eliminate empty or discontinuous voters from any definition of shareholders eligible to propose bylaw changes with regard to nominations or to nominate directors on the company ballot"); Andrea
Zanoni, Hedge Funds' Empty Voting in Mergers and Acquisitions: A Fiduciary Duties Perspective
3-4 (Oct. 17, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=l285589
(recommending that mergers and acquisitions in which shareholders employ empty voting should
require approval by a majority of disinterested shareholders and scrutinized using a fiduciary duties
perspective).
66
JAMES P. HAWLEY & ANDREWT. WILLIAMS, THERISEOFFIDUCIARYCAPITAUSM 3-7,
21 (2000).
67
See Robert G. Hansen & John R. Lott, Jr., Externalities and Corporate Objectives in a
World with Diversified Shareholder/Consumers, 31 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 43, 53-54
(1996).
68
See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Outsider Trading as an Incentive Device,
40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 21,40-41 (2006) (discussing effect of diversified owners on extranalities).
69
See Ronald W. Masulis et al., Agency Problems at Dual-Class Companies, 64 J. FIN.
1697 (empirical studies finding "as insider voter rights rise relative to cash-flow rights, dual class
firms tend to make less profitable capital investments, consistent with these firms making investment
decisions in pursuit of private benefits rather than shareholder wealth maximization").
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institutional investors. 70 If insiders hold a majority of the votes, of course, no
change in proxy voting will deprive them of control; only forbidding dual
class stock would do that. However, in many cases, owners of high-voting
stock still have far less than a majority of the votes. They maintain control
only because they also control the company's proxy statement. In these
cases, shifting control of the proxy statement to the shareholders could end
the abuses despite the existence of dual class voting.

E. Different Investment Preferences
Investors have different investment preferences. One area of difference is risk, 71 but this has little effect on investors' attitudes about the
strategy of a company. First, very cautious investors tend toward investments other than common stocks, in which case they are not shareholders
with voting rights. Owners of common shares tend to be risk neutral-they
accept the risks of the stock market generally, but do not want the greater
risks of individual stock issues. Their preferences, however, are easily satisfied without reducing returns by holding a diversified portfolio of common
stocks. 72 It makes no sense to buy a company's stock and then urge it to
pursue a low-risk strategy that would reduce its share value.
One exception to this risk-neutrality is employee shareholders, but
they are unlikely to distort corporate govemance. 73 Another exception are
large shareholders that received stock as a gift or inheritance and cannot
easily sell. Usually, however, these shareholders are corporate officers or
close relatives of officers, i.e., they are insiders whose interests clash with
those of public investors. The solution to this problem is not to maintain the
current regime of CEO dominance (which favors insiders), but to institute
true shareholder controC4

70

See OESTERLE, supra note I 5, at 263 (stating that higher-voting stock is "sold exclusively
to insiders"); id. at 266 (stating that in "time-phased" voting plans, "[i]nsiders hold and outsiders
trade," with the result that insiders wind up holding most of the higher-voting stock).
71
See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 6, at II 6 ("Attitudes towards risk vary considerably.").
72
See id. at 1I 7 ("Investors can eliminate unsystematic [i.e., firm-specific] risk by diversifying their portfolio.").
73
See Santella et al., supra note 26, at 13 (discussing ownership concentration).
74
Shareholder primacy would not help if the insiders and their allies own a majority of the
equity, but at least in that case the control group would bear a majority of any loss in stock value that
it causes. Another minor exception to the rule of shareholder unity is instructive. A recent empirical
study fmds that institutional investors have varied preferences about leverage. Johan Sulaeman, Do
Shareholder Preferences Affect Corporate Policies? 8- I 5 (Oct. 1, 2008) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= l I 02005. What, then, is a poor CEO to do? The study finds
that "finns that change leverage ratios in the opposite direction of the aggregate preferences of their
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Jeffrey Gordon fears that different preferences or beliefs lead to
"cycling" in which "each option selected bymajorityvote is in tum defeated
75
by another option preferred by another majority coalition. " In the examples
of cycling that he offers, however, it seems that investors in public
companies would probably reconcile their differences by adjusting their
respective portfolios rather than by waging a value-reducing corporate war.
Underscoring the implausibility of cycling problems is the fact that all his
examples are hypothetical-he offers no actual events in evidence. 76

F. The Impact of Institutional Investors
The preceding sections of Part ill present strong evidence that the goal
of most shareholders of public companies is to maximize share value;
exceptions are fairly rare and insignificant. However, the argument there
rested on inferences-albeit reasonable inferences. The issue is empirically
testable, though, and many empirical studies have been performed. Taken
together, these studies make an overwhelming case for the essential unity of
shareholders.
The most shiking evidence is the many studies finding that the
existence or acquisition of large block stock holdings in a company by
institutional investors does not cause the company's stock price to fall but
rather to rise, and the increase is greater if the shareholder is expected to be
aggressive. 77 One study fmds that performance-based CEO pay works best
when a large blockholder monitors CEO performance. 78 Another fmds that

shareholder experience lower stock returns than those that follow the aggregate leverage preferences
of their institutional investors." !d. at 31. This finding supports the view that shareholder democracy would improve corporate governance.
75
Gordon, supra note 8, at 360.
76
See id. at 368-69.
77
See Brad M. Barber, lvlonitoring the Monitor: Evaluating CalPERS' Activism, 16 J.
[NVESTING 66, 71-74 (2007); Michael J. Barclay & Clifford G. Holderness, The Law and LargeBlock Trades, 35 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268-69 (1992); Henrik Cronqvist & Rudiger Fahlenbrach,
Large Shareholders and Corporate Policies, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3941 (2009); Sanford J. Grossman
& Oliver D. Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation, II
BELL J. ECON. 42, 44 (1980); April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism:
Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors, 64 J. FIN. 187 (2009); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W.
Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. POL. ECON. 461, 47.0 (1986); Andrei
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 756 (1997).
78
See Robert Daines et al., The Good, the Bad, and the Lucky: CEO Pay and Skill18 (NYU
Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 04-035, 2005), available at http://ssm.
corn!abstract=622223; see also Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are CEOs Rewarded
for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are, 116 Q.J. ECON. 901, 920-22 (2002) (finding the
presence of large stockholders on the board of directors as a statistically significant variable
affecting the relationship between CEO pay and performance).
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large blockholders do not reduce, but increase, finn investment. 79 This is not
surprising since the stock market tends to punish companies that cut research
and development (R&D) and to "reward those with a commitment toR.&
D.--often years before long-term projects reap benefits." 80
81
Even hedge funds, which are often denounced, have this effect.
Martin Lipton accuses them of"exacerbating the tension between short-term
perfonnance and long-term success of corporations. "82 Even on its face the
charge is dubious: it posits that sophisticated investors pressure companies in
which they have huge investments to take certain steps, even though they
know (or should know) that they could reap supra-market returns by waiting.
Can it be that an entire industry behaves so foolishly? If they do, how is it
that so many hedge funds have generated such handsome profits? And if the
charge is true, why haven't other investors caught on to it? Are the vast
majority of investors idiots? Quite simply, the investing public perceives
these situations not as a threat but as a boon to share value. 83

79

Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, supra note 77, at 3956.
Mark Hulbert, To Make a Stock Pop, Innovate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31,2008, § 3, at 7.
81
See JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES
BROKEN 244-51 (2008) (explaining ways in which hedge funds have bad a strong, beneficial effect
on corporate governance); Robin Greenwood & Michael Schor, Investor Activism and Takeovers, 92
J. FIN. ECON. 362, 3 70 (2009) (presenting results of an empirical study, which fmds that companies
subjected to hedge fund activism earn positive abnormal returns, largely by forcing the target firms
into takeovers); Chris Young, Hedge Funds to the Rescue, Bus. WK., July 31, 2006, at 86 (stating
that hedge funds have become "the catalyst" for proxy fights, leading shareholders in opposing
value-reducing initiatives); Alon Brav et al., The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism 1 (ECGI, Law
Working Paper No. 098/2008, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=J I I 1778 ("The abnormal
stock return upon announcement of [hedge fund] activism is approximately seven percent, with no
reversal during the subsequent year."); Karen Brenner, Shareholder Activism and Implications for
Corporate Governance 2 (Mar. 26, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=! I 15474 (discussing studies that support the view that "firms targeted by activist hedge
funds have earned abnormal positive returns"); Chris Clifford, Value Creation or Destruction?
Hedge Funds as Shareholder Activists 25 (June 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available a/
http://ssrn.com/abstract=971018 (providing evidence that "firms targeted by activists do not earn
smaller long-run returns than firms targeted by passivists"); Jiekun Huang, Hedge Funds and
Shareholder Wealth Gains in Leveraged Buyouts 24-25 (May 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086687 (fmding the presence of a hedge fund as a large
shareholder is associated with higher premiums in leveraged buyouts); see also Kahan & Rock,
supra note 61, at 1091-92 (stating that traditional institutional investors are happy to "tag[] along"
behind activist hedge funds); Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 16-17 (describing cooperation of
mutual funds with hedge fund activism).
82
Martin Lipton, Some Thoughts for Boards ofDirectors in2008, I I BRIEFLY 1, 3 (2008).
83
See Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 16, at 52 (stating that "hedge funds are merely reacting
to the failure of other institutions to exercise their franchise for the benefit of all shareholders"); see
also Zanoni, supra note 65, at 15 (inferring from positive Markey reaction to hedge fund investment
that investors perceive hedge fund intervention as adding value to the stock).
80
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But even the basic claim that hedge funds are quick in-and-out
ip.vestors has been disproved. 84 Moreover, studies of corporate performance
show that investors are right about large blockholders. Companies with
large outside shareholders tend to perform better and have less waste than
other companies. 85 And when one or more investors acquire a large block of
a company's stock, the company's stock price does not decline after its initial
. b ut ten d s to k eep growmg.
. 86
nse
Opponents of shareholder power warn that the election of some
shareholder nominees will lead to debilitating tension and conflict on the
87
board. However, a recent study found that companies to which activist
investors (like hedge funds) elected dissident directors (but did not win full
control of the board) had much higher shareholder returns than peer com.
88
pames.

84

See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1409
(2007) (fmding that activist investors are not "short tenn investors who extract cash and exit
immediately"); Alan Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729 (2008) (finding that gains produced by hedge fund intervention do not
deteriorate in the one-year period following the initial announcement of investment).
85
See Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, supra note 77, at 3944 (fmding that firms with aggressive
large shareholders had higher return on assets); Brav et al., supra note 81, at I ("Target firms
experience increases in payout, operating performance, and higher CEO turnover after [hedge fund]
activism."); Anup Agrawal & Tareque Nasser, Blockholders on Board and CEO Compensation,
Turnover and Finn Valuation (Sept. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=l443431. Clifford, supra note 81, at 19-21 (fmding that fmns targeted by activist shareholders experienced improved operating performance (measured by return on assets) following the
shareholders' investment).
86
See Brav et al., supra note 84, at 1761-63 (fmding improvement in return on assets and
operating profit margins at targets of hedge funds two years after intervention, and total payout
increases and book value leverage increases, on average, from the year before to the year after an
announcement of intervention); Na. Dai, Does Investor Identity Matter? An Empirical Examination
ofInvestments by Venture Capital Funds and Hedge Fzinds in PIPEs, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 538 (2007)
(finding positive reactions to announcements of investments by hedge and private equity funds);
Klein & Zur, supra note 77, at 188 (fmding significantly positive abnormal returns for the year
following block purchases by hedge funds); Nicole M. Boyson & Robert M. Mooradian, Hedge
Funds as Shareholder Activists from 1994-2005, at I (July 31, 2007) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=992739 (presenting results indicating that "hedge fund activism
significantly improves short-term and long-term performance of target fmns compared to nontargets").
87
See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
88
See Chris Cemich et al., Effectiveness of Hybrid Boards 38 (May 2009) (unpublished
manuscript), available at https://www. proxygovemance.com/content/pgi/img/2009hybrid_boards.
pdf ("On average shareholder value at ongoing companies improved under hybrid boards by
19.1%-16.6 percentage points more than peers-from the contest period through the board's one
year anniversary."); see also MACEY, supra note 81, at 90-93 (describing benefits of "dissident
directors").
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Once again, the exceptions prove the rule. Some institutional investtors do vote against resolutions that would enhance share value, but this
behavior generally results from actual or potential pressure from the CE0. 89
The pressure need not be great or overt (or, perhaps, even intended) because
the CEO ordinarily so controls proxy voting that voting against management
is futile. The solution to the problem, then, is to end CEO domination. If
nominees for the board were chosen by the ten to twenty largest shareholders, those shareholders would have little ability to coerce other shareholders to vote with them; shareholders would be free to vote in their own
interests.

G. The Absence ofShareholder Conflict
The discussion so far suggests that each group of special interest
shareholders generally owns a small fraction of public companies' equity and
that the aspirations of the various groups tend to cancel each other out.
Accordingly, it seems unlikely that special interest groups could divert a
company from the general shareholder goal of maximizing share price. 90

89

See JACOBS, supra note 13, at 52 (distributing pressure felt by pension fund managers to
vote with management); ROE, supra note 4 7, at 62 ("[A]s purveyors of insurance products, pension
plans, and other financial services to corporations, [insurers] have reason to mute their corporate
governance activities and be bought off."); BernardS. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise
ofinstitutianallnvestor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REv. 811, 826 (1992) (stating that money managers that
vote against management "are likely to lose any business that they conduct with the company");
Gerald F. David & E. Han Kim, Business Ties and Pro:xy Voting by Mutual Funds, 85 J. F!N.ECON.
552 (2007) (finding that mutual funds with conflicts of interest, based on the management of a
company's pension assets, are more likely to vote with management); Jennifer S. Taub,Able but Nat
Willing: The Failure ofMutual Fund Advisers to Advocate for Shareholders' Rights, 34 J. CORP. L.
843, 845-46 (2009) (empirical study fmding that mutual fund advisers who have important business
interests in handling defmed contribution retirement plans are less likely than others to support
shareholder governance resolutions); Rasha Ashraf et a!., Conflicts of Interest and Mutual Fund
Proxy Voting: Evidence from Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation 3 (Oct. 9, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=I351966 ("[M]utual funds with a
pension-related business tie to the firm are more likely to vote against shareholder proposals than are
mutual funds that do not have a pension-related business tie."). For an informative case study, see
Gretchen Morgenson, Investors vs. Pfizer: Guess Who Has the Guns?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2006,
§ 3, at 1.
90
See Lisa M. Fairfax, Shareholder Democracy on Trial: International Perspective on the
Effectiveness ofIncreased Shareholder Power, 3 VA. L. & Bus. REV. I, 29 (2008) ("[S]hareholder
· democracy may be able to weed out all but the most value-enhancing initiatives, undercutting
shareholders' ability to advance personal agendas."); Battling for Corporate America-Shareholder
Democracy, ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 2006, at 75 ("[P]olitically motivated shareholders and hedge
funds are likely to gain any real power over management only if they can persuade the usually
passive majority to support them."); see also ROE, supra note 47, at 244-45 (noting the possibility of
shareholder coalitions); supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (noting that politically motivated
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If shareholders are sharply divided over goals, we should observe
many shareholder conflicts. Democracies, political parties, interest group
organizations, and coalitions evolve as vehicles to compete for power. We
should see similar behavior among competing shareholder groups at both the
company and the national levels. But we do not. "[S]hareholders do not
have the kinds of disputes one would expect if they were a diverse group of
Americans engaged in a struggle to make corporations in their images. "91
If shareholders were so divided that they preferred to be marginalized
in corporate governance, we would expect strong shareholder rights to be
associated with lower stock values. In fact, the opposite is true. 92 Strong
shareholder rights are also associated with better operating performance,93
and socially responsible shareholders own a small amount of stock).
91
Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate lvfanagers
Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1043 (1996); see also Edward B. Rock, The Logic
and (Uncertain) Significance ofInstitutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 466 (1991)
("[T]he potential for conflict between large and small shareholders will likely be minimal.").
92
See Jianxin (Daniel) Chi, Understanding the Endogeneity Between Firm Value and
Shareholder Rights, 34 FIN. MGMT. 65 (2005); Laura Lin, The Effectiveness ofOutside Directors as
a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 898, 922 (1996)
(citing empirical evidence that appointment of outside directors positively impacts stock prices);
Angie Low, Managerial Risk-Taking Behavior and Equity-Based Compensation, 92 J. FIN. ECON.
4 70 (2009) (presenting evidence that increased protection from takeovers caused managers to reduce
company risk with resultant decline in stock values); Vidhi Chhaochharia & Luc Laeven, Corporate
Governance, Norms and Practices (ECGI, Fin. Working Paper No. 165/2007, 2008), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=965733 (fmding pro-shareholder governance features adopted at the fmn
level are associated with higher market valuation of the firm); Don M. Autore et al., Do Analyst
Recommendations Reflect Shareholder Rights? 7 (Apr. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract= I 025627 ("One interpretation of our results is consistent with a 'one-sizefits-all' categorization of shareholder rights, in which all fmns should opt for strong exernal
governance in order to receive favorable recommendations from analysts."). Strong shareholder
rights actually "have higher IPO valuations and better long-term operating perforn1ance than their
peers." Jay C. Hartzell eta!., The Role of Corporate Governance in Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts, 51 J.L. & ECON. 539, 539 (2008). Strong shareholder
rights may also improve fmn asset values and thereby benefit bondholders as well. See Angie Low
et al., The Impact of Shareholder Power on Bondholders: Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions
(Mar. I, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=89!683.
93
See John E. Core et al., Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An Examination ofFirm Operating Pe1formance and Investors' Expectations, 61 J. FIN. 655, 659-61 (2006)
(stating that securities analysts weigh shareholder rights when making earnings forecasts); Paul
Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. l 07 (2003) (fmding in
the study that fmns with strong shareholder rights earned risk-adjusted annual returns 8.5% greater
than fmns with weak shareholder rights in 1990-99); Reena Aggarwal & Rohan Williamson, Did
New Regulations Target the Relevant Corporate Governance Attributes? 6 (Feb. 12, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=859264 ("Firms with strong
shareholder rights are found to have risk-adjusted returns that are 8.5% higher than those offmns
with low shareholder rights."); Sanjai Bhagat & Brian J. Bolton, Corporate Governance and Firm
Performance 2 (June 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=l017342 (finding that standard indices of good corporate governance, including several
factors strengthening shareholder power, are "significantly positively correlated with better
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less empire building, 94 more innovation, more successful acquisitions, more
reasonable executive compensation, and less shareholder litigation. 95
Proxy votes also show the fundamental unity of shareholders.
"Although a wide range of precatory resolutions are put forward [for
shareholder vote], the ones that obtain majority support are those ... that are
widely viewed by financial institutions as serving shareholder interests." 96
One study of disputes on boards of American public companies both
confirms the absence of shareholder conflicts and reveals the real source of
friction. It fmds that "such conflicts typically appear to be the result of
power struggles between management and directors" over corporate governance and control issues. 97 Disputes were more common when the CEO
was powerful and independent blockholdings were lower. 98 Disputes were
also more common in firms with poor operating and stock price
perfonnance, and disclosure of disputes generally occasioned large stock
price declines. 99 The problem of corporate governance is not divided or
overly powerful shareholders, but autocratic CEOs.
In sum, conflicts among shareholders are fairly rare and minor. Cases
where such conflicts are significant (as in companies with dual class stock)

contemporaneous and subsequent operating performance"); 0yvind B0hren et al., Corporate
Governance and Real Investment Decisions 18 (Mar. 2, 2007) (EFA 2007 Ljubljana Meetings
Paper), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=891 060; Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor,
Corporate Governance and Firm Operating Performance 2 (Dec. 7, 2006) (unpublished manuscript),
m'ailable at http://ssrn.com/abstract=814205 (finding that several pro-shareholder governance
criteria are associated with higher returns on equity and on assets); C.S. Agnes Cheng et al.,
Shareholder Rights and the Cost of Equity Capital 26 (Feb. 2006) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=594505 (finding the strength of shareholder rights to be
significantly associated with the cost of equity capital; "[i]nvestors apparently perceive weak shareholder rights as an important source of agency costs and demand higher rates of return accordingly"). The correlation between shareholder rights and corporate performance has been confmned
in the recent fmancial crisis: "those banks with the strongest corporate governance controls
performed the best." Marcia Milton Cornett et al., The Financial Crisis: Did Corporate Governance
Affect the Performance of Publicly-Traded U.S. Bank Holding Companies? 2 (Sept. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 14 76969.
94
See Clara Xiaoling Chen et al., Managerial Empire Building, Corporate Governance, and
the Asymmetrical Behavior of Selling, General, and Administrative Costs 4, 25-26 (Oct. 25, 2008)
(AAA 2008 Financial Accounting and Reporting Section Paper), available at http://ssrn.com
/abstract= 1014088 (presenting results of empirical study).
95
See infra note 204.
96
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reply: Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784,
I 799 (2006).
97
Anup Agrawal & Mark A. Chen, Boardroom Brawls: An Empirical Analysis ofDisputes
Involving Directors 1 (July 1, 2008) (EFA 2008 Athens Meetings Paper), available at http://ssrn.
corn/abstract=1101035.
98Jd.
99Jd.
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arise not for the reasons posited by critics of shareholder power but because
of abuses by insiders, whom these same critics tend to champion.

N. SHORT-TERMISM Is NOT A SERIOUS PROBLEM
A. Shareholder Attitudes

Although shareholder myopia is often alleged, "there is not a lot of
empirical data to back it up." 100 "[N]o one has demonstrated that the long/
short phenomenon exists." 101 Firms targeted by shareholder activists do not
suffer the ills that the myopia theory would predict. If that theory were true,
activist shareholders would somehow pump up the share price of targeted
companies and dump their stock at the inflated price, which would then fall
(to its "proper" level). Instead, returns to stocks of companies targeted by
activist hedge funds show significant positive returns in the one-year, twoyear, and three-year periods following the fund's acquisition of the stock. 102
Many shareholders, including institutions, do trade stocks rapidly. 103
Sometimes there is a reason for this behavior. Most mutual funds, for example, offer to redeem shares at any time for cash. 104 They must retain enough
liquidity for this purpose. Even if rapid trading is bad investment strategy, it
does not dictate myopia regarding corporate governance. In many situations
people own property briefly, yet treat it as carefully as long-term owners. 105
People who hold cash briefly are not careless with it. Merchants often buy
and sell goods rapidly without abusing them. Charges of myopia also
conflict with standard theories of market behavior. "Under elementary

100

Joe Nocera, A Defense ofShort-Termism, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2006, at Cl. "Baruch
Lev, the well-known accounting professor at New York University ... scoffs at the notion that
short-termism is even a problem." !d.
101
Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory ofAmerican Corporate Finance, 91 COLU!v!. L. REV.
10, 13 (1991); see also Luigi Zingales, The Future ofSecurities Regulation, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 391,
415 (2009) ("While popular, I do not know of any empirical support for this view."). ·
102
See Clifford, supra note 81, at 23-25.
103
In one study, mutual funds had a median portfolio turnover rate of0.72, meaning that
they held their investments somewhat more than a year on average. Ying Duan, The Role of Mutual
Funds in Corporate Governance: Evidence from Mutual Funds' Proxy Voting and Trading Behavior
24 tb1.2 (Mar. 7, 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston College), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract= 1101809. Another study implies that hedge funds hold equity positions for an average
of twenty-two months. Brav eta!., supra note 81, at 8. Clearly these investors are not just gambling
on quarterly earnings.
104
See Duan, supra note 103, at 2 ("[M]utual funds must preserve liquidity to meet
investors' redemption requests.").
105
See Julian Velasco, Shareholder Ownership and Primacy, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 38-39, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=l274244).
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principles of fmance, even short-term investors have an incentive to max106
imize the finn's long-term value."
Ifmyopia was endemic in American
companies we should see profitable investment opportunities going begging.
No one has shown this to be the case.
What evidence do short-term theorists offer for their charges? First,
investms do react to short-term (e.g., quarterly) results. Announcement that
a company has fallen (or expects to fall) short of analysts' forecasts typically
causes its stock price to fall more than would be predicted by a mere
problem with one quarter's earnings. 107 Second, CEOs and CFOs report that
they feel pressure from investors to meet or exceed analysts' projections, and
many say that they would take steps damaging to long-term value to meet
. .
108
those proJectiOns.
This evidence hardly clinches the claims of short-termism. Failure to
meet market forecasts for one quarter often augurs longer term problems.
Some think that stock markets overreact to short-term developments, but the
evidence is ambiguous at best. 109 This is not surprising. If the stock market
did regularly overreact to short-term results, it would be easy to earn superior

106

Bemard Black & Reinier Kraakrnan, Delaware's Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search
for Hidden Value, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 521,532 (2002); see Bebchuk, supra note 96, at 1802 ("If a
governance provision does not serve long-term shareholder value, its adoption will likely reduce
short-term prices (which reflect expectations about long-term value)."); Ronald J. Gilson, Leo
Strine's Third Way: Responding to Agency Capitalism, 33 J. CORP. L. 47, 53 (2007) ("[A]bsent
significant market inefficiency in pricing stocks, short term strategies by companies, portfolio
managers, or mutual funds are not likely to succeed."); Roe, supra note 101, at 13 ("The long/short
controversy posits a market failure. After all, institutions should know how to discount long-term
value to present value.").
107
See Strine, supra note 9, at 1764, 1772-73.
108
MAITEO TONELLO, REVISITING STOCK MARKET SHORT- TERMJSM 8 (2006) (reporting
that "most business managers stated that they would rather forgo an investment promising a positive
return on capital than miss the quarterly earnings expectations of their analysts and fmanciers");
John R. Graham eta!., The Economic Implications ofCorporate Financial Reporting, 40 J. ACCT.
& ECON. 3, 5 (2005) (reporting that more than half of CFOs surveyed said they would forgo a
profitable project in order to meet quarterly earnings estimates of analysts).
109
See Mary E. Barth et al., Market Rewards Associated with Patterns of Increasing
Earnings, 37 J. ACCT. REs. 387, 410 (1999) ("[E]amings multiples decrease ... as a pattern of
increasing earnings is followed by a pattern of decreasing earnings."); Douglas J. Skinner & Richard
G. Sloan, Earnings Surprises, Growth Expectations, and Stock Return or Don't Let an Earnings
Torpedo Sink Your Portfolio, 7 REv. ACCT. STUD. 289 (2002) (fmding the negative reaction especially severe for growth firms); M.L. Defond & C.W. Park, Earnings Surprises Expressed in Cents
Per Share: Stock Price Effects and Implications for Accruals Management (Univ. of So. Cal.,
Working Paper, 2000) (on file with author); see also Richard Mergenthal Jr. et al., CEO and CFO
Career Penalties to Missing Quarterly Analysts Forecasts 3-4 (Apr. 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1152421 (fmding that "failure to meet the latest analyst consensus estimate is associated with lower bonuses and equity grants and a higher probability afforced
dismissal for both the CEO and the CFO").
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trading profits. One could just buy after a stock plummets after unexpectedly
bad news and sell (short) after a stock rises in response to unexpectedly good
news, then wait for the routine rebounds when the market corrects these
overreactions.
This strategy is far-fetched because there is no evidence that stocks
tend to overreact to announcements of unexpected short-term results and
then rebound. This is unsurprising since any such pattern would violate
basic tenets of market efficiency. 110 If such a pattern were discovered,
investors would immediately alter their behavior accordingly, i.e., they
would cease to overreact. But that, of course, would cause the phenomenon
to cease to exist. It is telling that no one touting short-termism has advocated
investing on a "rebound" strategy; it seems they do not even believe their
own sermons.
Evidence of CEOs' beliefs and attitudes is equally unconvincing.
People accused of behaving badly are always eager to blame outside pressure
and say "the devil made me do it." CEOs are no different. They may even
believe the alibi, but that does not make it ttue. Some may also cave in to
perceived investor pressure to take steps that the CEO believes will impair
long-term value, but that does not mean that the steps taken actually do
impair value.
CEOs may believe in short-termism partly because they face different
pressures from different constituencies. Employees (including subordinate
executives) benefit from high compensation and corporate growth, even if
that growth does not increase profits. 111 Communities where the firm is
located also benefit when it raises employee compensation and expands
operations. For shareholders, though, employee compensation and corporate
expansion entail costs that should be undertaken only if they will raise
profitability, in which case they will also raise share value. A CEO tom by
conflicting demands from different constituencies may be tempted to
dissemble by telling employees that she cut compensation or growth due
only to pressure from irrational, short-term oriented investors. Moreover,
since a CEO works constantly with other employees but only sporadically
with investors, and is herself an employee with an employee's interests, she

110

The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis holds that capital markets efficiently price
securities at the present value of all expected future returns. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEW ART
C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 347-70 (7th ed. 2003) (describing and documenting the hypothesis).
111
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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may persuade herself that the steps she takes have been forced on her by
irrational shareholders. 112
Could CEOs be right that investors do urge steps that increase shortterm earnings to the detriment of long-term value? The evidence is overwhelming that shareholders do not behave in this manner. Rather, they favor
steps that increase long-term value. Among the most controversial of these
steps are the sale of some of a firm's lines of business and borrowing money
and distributing the proceeds thereof to shareholders through dividends or
stock repurchases. 113 Investors also often clash with management over corporate acquisitions and expansion and takeover bids. 114 Shareholders have
also forced many public companies to abandon poison pills. 115 In all these
cases, though, both the opinions of experts and the empirical evidence
indicate that the shareholders' position enhances long-tenn value. 116

112
Tbis may help explain why high ownership by "dedicated" institutional investors is
associated with a lower likelihood of a firm's disclosing material weaknesses in its internal control
system, and better operating performance and stock returns, while high ownership by "transient"
institutional investors is associated with a greater likelihood of reporting material weaknesses in
internal controls and inferior operating performance and stock returns. See Alex P. Tang & Li Xu,
Institutional Ownership, Internal Control Material Weaknesses and Finn Performance 3, 29 (Nov. 1,
2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=l 031270. The authors
speculate that "firms with higher dedicated ownership face greater scrutiny and are thus less likely to
develop serious internal control problems. On the contrary, firms with higher transient ownership
might cater to the interests of these short-term traders, resulting in the deteriorated internal control
mechanism." !d. However, they offer no evidence of pressure from "transient" shareholders causing
these results. 11ms, the study may offer support for increasing the power of "dedicated" (or longterm or patient) shareholders.
IIJ See Brav et al., supra note 8 I, at 5-6 (listing issues raised by hedge funds for targeted
companies, including spinoffs, reducing excess cash, and increasing leverage or dividends); Partnoy
& Thomas, supra note 16, at 35 (stating that hedge funds often "try to persuade managers to change
the capital structure of the company (typically to pay substantial dividends, repurchase shares, or
take on additional debt) in ways the hedge funds believe will maximize the value of the shares").
114
See Brav et al., supra note 81, at 5-6 (listing issues raised by hedge funds for targeted
p01tfolio companies, including acquisitions, growth strategy, takeover defenses, and sale of the
company). "In 2007, institutions and hedge funds launched campaigns against approximately 40
transactions." Daniel A. Neff, Takeover Law and Practice: 2008 13, in 5TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE
ON CORPORATE, SECURITIES, AND RELATED ASPECTS OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 317, 336
(2008) (on file with the author). In many cases this opposition has led to higher prices in the
challenged transaction. See id.
115
See Neff, supra note 114, at 15 (stating that as a "result of this activism" the number of
S&P 500 companies with poison pills declined from 46% at the end of 2005 to 28% in 2008).
116
For example, hedge fund activism produces both higher stock prices and operating
improvements for target companies. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text. Takeover
defenses, typically favored by managers and opposed by sophisticated shareholders, are associated
with significantly lower fmn value. See Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate
Governance, 22 REv. FIN. STUD. 783, 805-06 (2009) (empirical study). Partnership agreements
often compel distribution of profits in order to curb managers' discretion to make inefficient use of
cash. See Larry E. Ribstein, Partnership Governance ofLarge Firms, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 289,290-
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Activist shareholders usually pursue poorly performing companies. 117
Confusion sometimes arises because some targets of shareholder activism
and takeover bids are well operated. 118 This fact leads critics to charge that
targets are undervalued in the irrational, shortsighted stock market. Knowing raiders exploit this rnispricing by offering illusory premiums while really
grabbing the targets at bargain prices. Activist shareholders force patient
companies into imprudent changes that nonetheless cause a short-term rise in
the company's earnings and, thus, stock price because of the irrational
myopia of the stock market. 119
While it is true that many corporate targets are well-managed, the
charge of market mispricing is false. Despite strong cash flows, targets generally have "relatively low dividend yield and diversifying investments that
might not be in the best interest of shareholders." 120 In other words, managers of targets were producing solid retums but refusing to distribute those
retums to shareholders, who reasonably feared that the retained earnings
might be wasted and never paid out. 121 The companies' low stock prices
reflect these fears, not myopia or some other irrationality. Raiders and
activist shareholders raise stock values by preventing this waste.
Short-term theorists also accuse activist shareholders of forcing
companies to skimp on R&D to the detriment of long-term value. 122 Again,
there is little evidence that this is true, and many good reasons to think it is
false. High institutional ownership of a company's stock is not associated

91 (2009).
117

See Roberta Romano, Less Is Jvfore: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable
Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 183 (2001) (stating that institutional investors have targeted poorly performing companies).
118
See Brav et al., supra note 81, at 7 (stating that targets of hedge fund activism generally
had above-average return on assets and "handsome cash flows"); see also supra notes 81-86 and
accompanying text (listing benefits of hedge funds to in vestee companies).
119
See supra notes 19-20, 82 and accompanying text.
120
Brav et al., supra note 81, at 7.
121
Michael Jensen saw this wasting of free cash flow as the reason why shareholders
pressured companies to go private through buyouts. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs ofFree
Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986); see also George
W. Dent, Jr., Academics in Wonderland: The Team Production and Director Primacy Models of
Corporate Governance, 44 Hous. L. REv. 1213, 1244-49 (2008) (explaining that investors remain
unclear on how and when a company's profits will be distributed due to executives and managers
interest in retaining earnings or increasing corporate compensation); John J. McConnell & Chris J.
Muscarella, Corporate Capital Expenditure Decisions and the Market Value ofthe Finn, 14 J. FIN.
ECON. 399, 415 (1985) (study of capital expedienture announcements).
122
See Michael E. Porter, Capital Choices: Changing the Way America Invests in Industly,
5 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 4, 5-6 (1992); Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 8, at 1291 ("[S]tockprice can
be driven upward temporarily by increasing short-term earnings at the expense of long~term results,
e.g., by cutting research and development."); Bratton, supra note 19, at 1359 (stating that activist
shareholders often push to cut "excess" costs like R&D).
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with lower R&D. 123 Activist hedge funds tend to target companies with
below-average R&D. 124 Institutional ownership in public companies is asso125
ciated with more innovation (as measured by patents).
It is significant that activist investors never declare that they want a
company to cut R&D since they are not reticent when they seek other
changes. If some investors secretly urged cuts in R&D, managers could
divulge the fact themselves, but this never happens either. Changes sought
by activists typically cause a firm's stock price to rise, but increases (rather
126
than cuts) in R&D usually raise stock price, so there is no reason to think
that rational investors would want to cut R&D. If any shareholder(s) tried to
lower a firm's R&D, other investors would have an incentive to oppose that
effort, yet such conflicts are never reported.
Indeed, there is evidence that weak shareholders are associated with
lower R&D. Some studies find that companies that have strong takeover
defenses (which managers favor and sophisticated investors dislike) or adopt
new defenses reduce investment in R&D and in general. 127 In sum, the
charge that activist investors try to cut corporate R&D seems meretricious.

123

See OFFICE OF TilE CIDEF ECONOMIST, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, INSTITUTIONAL
OWNERSHIP, TENDER OFFERS, AND LONG-TERM INvESTMENTS 6 (1985) ("[T]he higher the institutional holdings in a fmn, the higher is its R&D activity."); Brian J. Bushee, The Influence of
Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment Behavior, 73 ACCT. REV. 305, 330 (1998)
(empirical study finding that "managers are significantly less likely to cut R&D to reverse an
earnings decline when institutional ownership is high," with certain exceptions); Parthiban David et
a!., The Influence ofActivism by Institutional Investors on R&D, 44 ACAD. MGMT. J. 144, 148-49
(2001) (finding that institutional investor activism increased R&D inputs over both short and long
tem1s).
124
See Brav et al., supra note 81, at 7 (showing that these targets "tended to have low[er]
levels of R&D spending ... than non-targeted firms"). But see Alan Brav et al., Hedge Fund
Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1755 (2008) (questioning the statistical significance of the relationship between a firm's level ofR&D and its attractiveness
to hedge funds).
125
See Philippe Aghion et al., Innovation and Institutional Ownership 3-7 (Univ. of Chi.
Booth Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 09-05, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1348142
(empirical study).
126
See J. Randall Woolridge, Competitive Decline and C01porate Restructuring: Is a
Myopic Stock Market to Blame?, 1 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 26, 33-34 (1988). See generally
McConnell & Muscarella, supra note 121, at 415 (comparing the effect of budget increases and
decreases in several areas, including R&D).
127
See JACOBS, supra note 13, at I 08 (citing a study by the SEC's Office of Economic
Analysis); Olubunrni Faleye, Classified Boards, Stability, and Strategic Risk Taking, 65 FIN.
ANALYSTS J. 54, 61 (2009) (showing that companies with staggered boards invested less in R&D);
B0hren et al., supra note 93, at 3 ("[L]ess monitoring by owners makes managers invest less rather
than more in order to enjoy the quiet life.").
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The charge that myopic shareholders force short-termism on
farsighted managers seems not only wrong but backwards. To the extent
that myopia is a problem, it stems from the managers, not the shareholders.
B. Going Private
It is also argued that the trend of public companies to go private is
spurred by investor short-termism: eliminating public shareholders frees
visionary managers to build long-term value. 128 This indictment is also
feeble. First, going private has benefits unrelated to operations. Plivate
firms avoid the costs of compliance with many provisions of the SarbanesOxley Act and the SEC's reporting requirements for public companies. 129
Private firms can also keep their activities secret from competitors, suppliers,
customers, and others who could use information to the firms' detliment.
It is true, however, that some of the gains from going private stem
from operational changes or restructuring. The question, though, is whether
those changes are possible only after eliminating public investors. The
answer is no. Typically, firms that go private do not take steps resisted by
shareholder activists, like making corporate acquisitions, expanding operations, raising employee pay, or reducing debt. On the contrary, they tend to
take the opposite steps, which are generally favored and often urged by
investors. 130

128

See Dale A. Oesterle, Are Leveraged Buyouts a Form of Govemance Arbitrage?, 3
BROOKLYN J. CORP. FIN. & CoM. L. 53, 67 (2008). In private companies "investors appreciate
longer time horizons. In publicly-traded companies, executives often feel the need to focus on
quarterly results and are more risk averse to longer term gambles." !d. (footnote omitted); see also
Stout, Bolshy Investors, supra note 5 (stating that private companies can "avoid dealing with public
shareholders' loud and often conflicting demands").
129
The enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was followed by an increase in going private
transactions. See, e.g., Stanley B. Block, The Latest lvfovement to Going Private: An Empirical
Study, 14 J. APPLIED FIN. 36, 36-37 (2004); Ellen Engel et al., The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Firms'
Going-Private Decisions, 44 J. ACCT. & ECON. 1!6, 126-27 (2007); Ehud Kamar et al., GoingPrivate Decisions and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002: A Cross-CounllyAnalysis, 25 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 107, ll7 (2008). It was also followed by an increase in ftrms "going dark," i.e., deregistering
without eliminating all public shareholders. See Christian Leuz et a!., Why Do Firms Go Dark?
Causes and Economic Consequences ofVoluntmy SEC Deregisfl·ations, 45 I. ACCT. & ECON. 181,
183 (2008) ("[W]e fmd that the time pattern of going-dark decisions is closely associated with the
passage of SOX.").
·
Do See David Haarmeyer, Private Equity: Capitalism's Misunderstood Entrepreneurs and
Catalysts for Value Creation, 13 INDEP. REV. 24 5, 246-4 7, 254-59 (2008) (describing how pri valeequity owned ftrms align the interests of managers and investors and avoid waste); Ronald W.
Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity Create Wealth? The Effects ofPrivate Equity
and Derivatives on Corporate Governance, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 219, 227-30 (2009); Karen H.
Wruck, Private Equity, C01porate Govemance, and the Reinvention of the Market for C01porate
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Why are these measures embraced only after a company goes private?
The answer cannot be that after going private a finn gets better management,
because the old managers usually remain. But the managers' incentives
change. A behavioral psychologist would say that the managers' schedule of
reinforcement is altered. First, shareholder monitoring changes. When a
company goes private, a "private equity" or "leveraged buyout" (LBO) finn
usually buys most of the equity. These investors have the same basic values
and world views as institutional investors in public companies. Indeed, their
funding comes largely from the very institutions often accused of myopia. 131
The behavior of companies controlled by private equity and LBO finns
belies the charge-the private equity and LBO firms and their own
institutional investors all want long-term value.
And they usually get it. They face none of the obstacles to control that
hinder shareholders of public companies. If managers of a private firm
attempt the value-destroying actions common to public companies or eschew
the value-increasing steps that public companies often spurn, the LBO firm
would overrule the managers and probably fire them. They stop the waste
that often plagues CEO-dominated public companies. 132
Further, the structure of executive compensation is very different in
private companies. Unlike managers of public firms, who can doctor their
"incentive compensation" so that they profit even if the firm slides, 133
managers of private firms are rewarded only if the firm succeeds. 134 Put
another way, in public companies the interests of managers and of
shareholders often clash, while in private firms the managers' compensation

Control, 20 J. APPLIED. CORP. FIN. 8, 9 (2008) (describing "the combination of high leverage,
strong governance, and increased management equity ownership as key contributors to the success"
of companies taken private in leveraged buyouts). Among other things, debt in the form of bank
loans results in bank monitoring, which improves corporate performance. See Joanna Shepherd et
al., What Else lol!attersfor Corporate Governance?: The Case for Bank Monitoring, 88 B.U. L.
REv. 991, 991, 996, 1017-20 (2008).
131
See Ballabon, supra note 12, at 26.
132
See Haarmeyer, supra note 130, at 247 (stating that private-equity control "helps to check
the resource waste and corporate malfeasance that often hold back, if not sink, public companies").
133
See Oesterle, supra note 128, at 64 ("Managers in publicly-traded companies ... do well
even if investors do not."). For example, CEOs tend to get bigger compensation from making
acquisitions "irrespective of acquisition performance," unless there is strong shareholder involvement in governance. Jerayr Haleblian et al., Taking Stock of What We Know About Mergers and
Acquisitions: A Review and Research Agenda, 35 J. MGMT. 469, 475 (2009).
134
See Oesterle, supra note 128, at 64 ("[T]he executives in buyout fund portfolio
companies participate more heavily in upside gains and downside losses than do the executives in
publicly-traded companies."); id. at 68 ("A far larger share of executive pay [in private firms] is tied
to the performance of the business.").
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is structured so that their interests largely coincide with those of the outside
shareholders, i.e., the LBO firms. 135
C. The Real Problem and Its Cure
That value-enhancing steps are often taken only after a public
company goes private shows that there is a problem. The problem, however,
is not that overly powerful investors with a short-tetm fixation force public
companies into actions that impair long-term value, but rather, the
opposite-investors hampered by the separation of ownership and control
try, but often fail, to get managers who are pursuing their own interests to
take steps that increase share value and to forego or rescind steps that impair
share value. 136
There may be some truth to the claim that going private frees
executives from pressures to focus on quatierly results, but that pressure
does not stem from investor short-tennism. Because CEOs dominate most
public companies, including their public disclosures, investors are often
unsure whether they are getting accurate information. Given this uncertainty, they may take an unexpected drop in earnings as a sign oflong-term
trouble. Because of this uncertainty, executives must devote much of their
time to public relations. 137 Nonetheless, executive reassurances are likely to
be discredited as self-serving.
The cure, then, for the disadvantage that public companies seem to
suffer in comparison with private firms is not to keep shareholders weak or
to cripple them further, but to vest them with real control. The board would
then instruct executives to maximize firm value for the benefit of shareholders-as they do in private firms. With shareholders in control, investors
would also trust corporate disclosure. Explanations about unexpected shOiiterm incidents would be taken seriously. Executives would not be pressured
to focus on quarterly results.

IJ5Conversely, when companies go public, executive compensation plans are likely to
change in ways that will injure corporate performance. The trend of banks to go public in the 1970s
may have helped lead to the errors that caused the recent bank meltdown. See Cenk Uygur, The
Flaw in the System: The Bankers Don't Care About the Banks, HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 2, 2009,
available at http://huffingtonpost.com/cenk-uygur/the-flaw-in-the-system-th_ b_170963 .htrnl.
136
Thus shareholder weakness is associated with less investment, including less investment
in R&D. See supra note 12 7.
137
See PAUL ARGENT! & JANIS FORMAN, THE POWER OF CORPORATE COMMUNICATION
64 (2002) (estimating that CEOs of public companies spend up to 80% of their time on
"communicating to constituencies").
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Even the Aspen Institute's Corporate Values Strategy Group, whose
members include the Business Roundtable and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce which consider short-termism a serious problem, 138 does not call for
weakening shareholders generally or short-term shareholders in particular. 139 Its primary focus is on executive compensation that may encourage
myopia. 140 That focus is justified. A CEO may inflate (or depress) the company's share price by reporting false news, then dumping her own stock (or
buying more) before the market learns the truth. 141 Many CEOs also choose

13

RSee supra note 20 and accompanying text.

139

lt does support "an amplified voice for long-term investors and ... explicit efforts to
communicate with long-tenn investors" and says "[b]oards and long-term oriented investors should
communicate on significant corporate governance and executive compensation policies and procedures." ASPEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES, supra note 20, at 2-3. Although the preference for "long-term investors" (which it never defmes) may not make sense, it is no cause for
concern since the interests of shareholders are largely congruent.
140
See id. at 3; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF
'08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 93 (2009) ("The tendency of corporate management ... to
maximize short-run profits ... is strengthened if, as on Wall Street during the boom, executive
compensation is both very generous and truncated on the downside."); Michael C. Jensen, The
Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT
OF THE HOSTILE T Al<EOVER 320 (John C. Coffee, Jr. et a!. eds., 1988) ("Sometimes [myopic
behavior] occurs when managers hold little stock in their companies and are compensated in ways
that motivate them to take actions to increase accounting earnings rather than the value of the
firm."); Zingales, supra note 101, at 413 ("[T]he 2007 to 2008 fmancial crisis is perceived as a
manifestation of excessive risk taking by managers who were enriching themselves with short-term
bonuses while destroying the long-term value of their companies."); JeffMadrick, How We Were
Ruined & What We Can Do, in THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Feb. 23, 2009, at 17 ("The
ability to take immediate [personal] profits from fees on risky loans infected the fmancial industry
and eventually the entire economy, and made possible disproportionately large annual bonuses.");
David I. Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus ofExecutive Pay 4 (Boston
Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 09-22, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1396663
("Perhaps the leading corporate governance concern oflegislators and commentators at the present is
the reckless pursuit of short-term profits by corporate executives who will have cashed out before the
long-term repercussions are felt.").
141
See ROBERT H. TILLMAN & MICHAEL L.lNDERGAARD, PUMP AND DUMP: THE RANCID
RULES OF THE NEW ECONOMY 4-5 (2005); David C. Cicero, The Manipulation ofExecutive Stock
Option Exercise Strategies: Information Timing and Backdating, 64 J. FIN. (forthcoming 2009)
(examining stock price patterns that suggest executives use private information to increase the
profitability of stock option exercises); Jap Efendi eta!., Why Do C01porate Managers Misstate
Financial Statements? The Role ofOption Compensation and Other Factors, 85 J. FIN. ECON. 667,
667 (2007) (fmding "that the likelihood of a misstated fmancial statement increases greatly when the
CEO has very sizeable holding of in-the-money stock options"); Jesse M. Fried, Hands-Off Options,
61 V AND. L. REV. 453,456 (2008) ("[M]anagers ... often inflate the short-term stock price before
selling to boost their trading profits."); John C. Coffee, Jr., A The01y of Corporate Scandals: Why
the U.S. and Europe Differ 6-8 (Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 274, 2005),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=694581 (noting that an industry-wide shift to equity-based
compensation created incentives for market and accounting manipulation); Walker, supra note 140,
at 4 (discussing "eamings manipulation, which often involves sacrificing long-term value to boost
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accounting methods that maximize reported earnings instead of share price,
142
even though the choice requires the company to pay higher taxes.
Some
waste corporate funds in "empire building"; others choose a "quiet life" by
· underinvesting corporate funds. 143 Thus, some call the claim that CEOs
manage for the long-term "bogus." 144 Regulation of executive compensation may have made matters worse. 145
Although executive compensation can be improved to align the
managers' incentives more closely with the shareholders', "even the optimal
pay arrangement would be more short-term focused than shareholders would
prefer." 146 Part of the problem is that "executives are inherently more risk
averse than diversified shareholders." 147 Also, objective measures offmn
performance are never perfect. Thus, in private firms, compensation is
148
"based more on subjective than objective performance measures."
The
use of subjective measures, however, requires the judgment of directors
pursuing shareholder benefit.
Institutions that hold a stock briefly monitor the issuer less than
institutions that hold for longer periods. 149 However, this says nothing about
the business strategy that either group of owners favor for portfolio firms.
near-term earnings") (footnote omitted); see also Bruce Billings et al., Managers' Incentives to A void
Meeting or Beating Earnings Expectations: The Role of Open Market Repurchases l (Jan. 12, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=l266889 (empirical study fmding
that some managers "opportunistically avoid reporting earnings that meet or beat analyst
expectations to depress stock prices and hence lower the cost of share repurchases"); Ronald R. Mau
& Catherine Shenoy, CEO Compensation: Does Performance Matter? l (July 8, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1431490 (analyzing results that "suggest CEOs
are able to increase their compensation before exceptionally bad performance through the timing of
[stock] option exercises").
142
See Sanjay Deshmukh eta!., Stock Option Expensing: The Role of Corporate Governance, 20 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 122, 123 (2008) ("[C]ompanies often make accounting decisions
designed to boost reported earnings."); David I. Walker, Financial Accounting and Corporate
Behavior 14-15 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 06-05, 2006),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=894002; see also Anne Beatty, How Does Changing
Measurement Change Management Behavior?: A Review of the Evidence 18 (Feb. 14, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=975234 (fmding that accounting
changes affect corporate behavior when they affect managers' compensation).
143
See Dent, supra note 121, at 1247.
144
Nocera, supra note 100.
145
See Walker, supra note 140, at 7 ("[P]ast regulation of executive pay may have encouraged compensation design that promotes short-tennism.").
146
Id. at 6.
147
/d. at 10.
148
Cynthia E. Devers et al., Executive Compensation: A Multidisciplinary Review ofRecent
Developments, 33 J. MGMT. 1016, 1020 (2007).
149
See Xia Chen eta!., Monitoring: Which Institutions Matter, 86 J. F£N. ECON. 279, 283
(2007) (noting that "monitoring benefits increase with the size of the investment stake"); JoseMiguel Gaspar et al., Shareholder Investment Horizons and the lvfarketfor Corporate Control, 76 J.
FIN. ECON. 135, 137 (2005).
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Short-term owners may not monitor much, but there is no evidence that they
pressure managers to take steps that impair share value. If some investors
did so, other shareholders would oppose them; "short-tennists" could prevail
only ifthey owned a majority of the stock. There is no evidence that this
150
ever happens.
To the extent that shareholders fail to monitor, it is partly due to
regulations that limit their ability to do so. 151 Several restraints limit the
ability of mutual funds to monitor and play an active role in portfolio
companies. 152 Some of these (like the need of open-end funds to maintain .
enough liquidity to cover redemptions) are practical. Others, though, are
153
regulatory and could be eliminated or relaxed.

V. SHAREHOLDERS ARE KNOWLEDGEABLE
A. Investor Sophistication and Capital Market Efficiency

As critics of shareholder power allege, not all owners of common
stocks are financially sophisticated or even rational, 154 but this fact has little
relevance for the efficiency of capital markets. If uninformed or irrational
investors push the price of a market commodity too low (or too high),
knowledgeable investors can profit by purchasing the underpriced (or selling
the overpriced) commodity. Only a critical mass of sophisticated investors is
needed for a market to be efficient, and if these investors are well funded,
the critical mass need not be large-perhaps as small as one. Shareholders
do not need to be knowledgeable about operational questions (on which they
do not vote), but only on "rules-of-the-game" issues (on which they do
vote ). 155 These issues "typically do not turn on inside, company-specific
information." 156

150

See Chen eta!., supra note 149, at 300-01.
See Haanneyer, supra note 130, at 259-60.
152/d
153
See id. (listing diversification requirements, restrictions on short selling and leverage, bars
on performance-based compensation, and disclosure obligations); see also Kahan & Rock, supra
note 61, at 1050 (explaining how regulations complicate performance fees associated with mutual
funds).
154
See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
155
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833, 881 (2005).
156
/d. Thus, claims that investors do or should cede control to managers, see supra note 5,
are clearly wrong. Rather, investors will delegate most operational decisions to the managers but
retain ultimate control. See Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, Control of Corporate Decisions:
Shareholder vs. Management 9 (CRSP, Working Paper No. 620, 2008), available at
151
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The sophistication of shareholders seems to be growing, and
occasionally shareholders form groups to help themselves understand issues
157
that are especially complex or where management disclosures are opaque.
Moreover, the allocation of power between managers and shareholders
should not depend solely on who is more knowledgeable, but also on who
has the better incentives to make the wealth-maximizing choice. Managers
may be better informed but, especially on rules-of-the-game issues, they
often have personal interests that conflict with wealth maxirnization. 158
Taking all this into account, the conditions for reasonable efficiency are
clearly obtained in the major stock markets for American public com.
159
pames.
B. Proxy Voting
The prudence of investors in general-and of institutional investors in
particular-is evidenced by their proxy voting behavior. 160 They tend to
161
make and to favor proposals that increase shareholders' value.
http://ssm.com/abstract=965559 (analysis based on formal model).
157
See Angela Morgan et al., The Evolution ofShareholder Voting for Executive Compensation Schemes, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 715, 723 (2006) (concluding that shareholders have become "more
sensitive to potentially harmful [executive compensation] plan provisions"); Rock, supra note 91, at
449-51 (describing examples of informed activism by institutional shareholders); see also Gretchen
Morgenson, Hear Ye, Hear Ye: Corralling Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2007, § 3, at I
(describing the formation of a group of Verizon Communications shareholders and the group's
criticism of compensation proposals).
158
See Devers et al., supra note 148, at 1029.
159
Despite the presence of irrational investors in the market place,
logic-not blind faith-provides a compelling reason for believing that publicly
traded U.S. equities are priced efficiently. The essence of the efficient market
hypothesis is that if there is unclaimed money lying around that can be picked up
without effort and without loss of integrity[,] people will take it until it is gone.
Mark Klock, Contrasting the Art of Economic Science with Pseudo-Economic Nonsense: The
Distinction Between Reasonable Assumptions and Ridiculous Assumptions 23 (Penn State Univ.
Dickinson Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 03-2008, 2009), available at http://ssm.
com/ abstract=\136810; see also ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 55 (1995) ("The public's valuation of a company in the marketplace has unique value,
because it is the only judgment that cannot be manipulated."); Henry Manne, Remarks on the Lewis
& Clark Law School Business Law Forum: Behavioral Analysis of Corporate Law: Instruction or
Distmction?, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 169, 175 (2006) ("[M]ere 'irrationality' on the part of
some stock market participants cannot foil an otherwise efficient market.").
160
See Bebchuk, supra note 155, at 876-77; see also Bebchuk, supra note 96, at 1799-1801
(arguing that shareholders only approve resolutions widely viewed as serving their interests).
161
See Bebchuk, supra note 96, at 1799-180 I; Angela Morgan et al., Mutual Funds as
Monitors: Evidence from Mutual Fund Voting I (July 7, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1431072 (finding that "mutual funds vote more affmnatively for wealth
increasing proposals and that funds' voting approval rates for these beneficial resolutions are
significantly higher than those of other investors").
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Shareholders often pressure companies to eliminate staggered boards, 162
163
which have been shown to reduce share value.
More shareholder proposals are submitted to finns that have performed poorly and have weak
corporate govemance. 164 If shareholders vote unwisely, one would expect
that expanding the duty of boards to obtain shareholder approval would be
perceived by the market as detrimental and cause stock prices to fall. In fact,
'the contrmy is tme. Legislation giving shareholders a "say on pay" increased
share values. 165
How careful are institutional investors in proxy voting? Traditionally,
most institutions rationally spent little time and money making voting
decisions since each institution (with rare exceptions) owned only a small
fraction of the stock of any company and its vote was unlikely to alter the
166
outcome of a particular resolution.
Although this obstacle to shareholder

162

See Mira Ganor, Why Do Managers Dismantle Staggered Boards?, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L.
149, 155-58 (2008) (describing frequent efforts by institutional investors to destagger boards).
163
See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN.
ECON. 409, 410-11 (2005) (showing a negative correlation between the presence of a staggered
board and share value); Lucian Arye Bebcbuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force ofStaggered
Boards: The01y, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 936-39 (2002) (establishing that
staggered boards allow directors too much independence from shareholders, resulting in lower target
share value after a hostile bid); Olubunmi Fa! eye, Classified Boards, Firm Value, and Managerial
Entrenchment, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 501, 528 (2007) (finding that "classified boards entrench management by focusing on CEO turnover, executive compensation, proxy contests, and shareholder
proposals"); Michael D. Frakes, Classified Boards and Firm Value, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 113, 15051 (2007) (recognizing the negative effects of classified boards). Similarly, declassifying boards
increases share value. See Faleye, supra, at 514-15; Ganor, supra note 162, at 185-86 (presenting
results of empirical study showing a correlation between destaggering and increased share value).
Companies with staggered boards also invest less in R&D. See Faleye, supra note 127, at 59-61.
164
See Luc Renneboog & Peter G. Szilagyi, Shareholder Activism Through the Proxy
Process 14-15 (CentER Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 2009-65, 2009), available at bttp://ssrn.
com/abstract=1460578 (empirical study). Also, "mutual funds are more likely to vote against
management in poorly governed firms." Duan, supra note I 03, at 18; see also id. at 14 (explaining
how the quality of corporate governance and not a firm's performance affects mutual funds' voting
decisions).
165
See Jie Cai & Ralph A. Wallding, Shareholders' Say on Pay: Does It Create Value? 2627 (Drexel Coli. of Bus., Research Paper No. 2008-06, 2009), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=] 030925 (fmding adoption offederal say-on-pay bill increased share values); John C.
Coates, IV, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investments of the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Harvard Law Sch., Public Law & Legal
Theory Working PaperNo. 09-56, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/absstract= 147355 (reporting
that say-on-pay has been beneficial in several other countries). But see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Is
"Say on Pay" Justified?, REGULATION, Spring 2009, at 42 (questioning the need for shareholder
"say on pay").
166
0ne study finds that, on average, each mutual fund holds 0.13% of each portfolio firm's
stock, and each mutual fund family holds 0.45%. Duan, supra note 103, at 8. Tax laws deter
mutual funds from owning more than 5% of the stock of any portfolio company. See Bernard S.
Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 552 (1990); Kahan & Rock,

136

DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW

[Vol. 35

activism persists, several factors are causing shareholders to be more
167
assertive.
Institutions can cheaply follow the advice of one of the proxy
advisory services, of which ISS Governance Services (ISS) is the most
widely used. 168 Further, proxy advisors "often announce their recommendations to the public, "169 so that nonsubscribers can follow them. These
recommendations mfluence proxyvotirlg. 170 And positive ISS recommendations are associated with a positive stock price effect. 171
Some fears have been expressed about the influence of proxy
advisors. In particular, questions have been raised about the possibility that,
because of its corporate consulting, ISS is subject to conflicts of interest that
subvert the objectivity of its voting recommendations. 172 A recent study
supra note 61, at 1049. Collectively, however, institutions on average own 70.04% of portfolio
firms' stock. Duan, supra note 103, at 9. !fa fund owns less of a company's stock than do some
competing funds, any success it achieves in raising the value of that company's stock would benefit
those competitors more than itself. On the disincentives to activism, see infra notes 175-81.
167
See Romano, supra note 117, at 175 ("Institutional investors have, in the past decade,
increasingly engaged in corporate governance activities.").
168
See Stephen J. Choi et al., Director Elections and the Influence of Prmy Advisors 3
(NYU Law and Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 08-22, 2008), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=ll27282 (stating that "[m]ost institutional investors subscribe to one or more
proxy advisors" and calling ISS "the dominant player in the market with over 2700 corporate and
institutional subscribers"); see also Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L.
887, 889-91 (2007) (describing the breadth of influence of proxy advisory services). ISS, formerly
Institutional Shareholder Services, was acquired by RislcMetrics Group in 2007. See RiskMetrics
Group History, http://www.riskmetrics.com/history (last visited Sept. 4, 2009). Other proxy advisory firms include Glass Lewis, Egan-Jones, Proxy Governance, and CtW Investment Group. Choi
et al., supra, at 3.
169
Choi et al., supra note 168, at 3.
170
See Jie Cai et al., Electing Directors, 64 J. FIN. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 16,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=ll 0 1924) (fmding that a negative ISS recommendation lowers
the vote for a director by 19% on average in uncontested elections); Cindy R. Alexander et al., The
Role of Advisory Services in Proxy Voting (July 2009) (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. Wl5143, 2009), available at http://www .nber.org/papers/w 15143; James Cotter et al.,
The Effect ofISS Recommendations on Mutual Fund Voting (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch., Law &
Econ. Working Paper No. 09-20, 2009) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1477564. A recent
study, however, finds "that advisor recommendations in general, and those of ISS in particular,
appear to be less influential than commonly perceived." Choi et al., supra note 168, at 51. In effect,
the advisors simply do the spade work in applying principles that investors already embrace to
specific voting situations; they do not pursue a separate agenda.
171
See Alexander et al., supra note 170, at 4.
tnRose, supra note 168, at 906-07; see also U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ISSUES
RELATING TO SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS: ISSUES RELATING TO FIRMS THAT ADVISE INSTITUTIONAL INvESTORS ON PROXY VOTING 2-4 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d07765.pdf; Choi et al., supra note 168, at 3-4. GAO found that"[ v]arious potential conflicts
of interest can arise at proxy advisory fmns that could affect vote recommendations, but SEC has
not identified any major violations in its examination of such fmns." !d. The study, however, also
said that "all institutional investors [GAO] spoke with that use ISS's services said they are satisfied
with" its mitigation procedures. ld. at 4. Nonetheless, some believe "there remains reason to
question the steps' effectiveness." !d.
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concludes that these fears are unfounded. "[P]roxy advisors act primarily as
agents or intermediaries which aggregate information that investors find
important in determining how to vote in director elections rather than as
independent power centers. "173 Further, proxy advisors other than ISS have
appeared since 2003. 174 By introducing competition, they reduce the ability
ofiSS to make recommendations that harm shareholders.
The growing influence of proxy advisors is changing the cost-benefit
equation for shareholder activism. In the past, most institutions hewed to the
Wall Street rule-vote with management or sell. Activist shareholders could
not expect much support from these institutions, even if they urged steps that
would elevate share value. This lack of coordination had little to do with
shareholders' having conflicting preferences. The main reason was, and still
is, a collective action problem. That is, stockholders who engage in activism
incur costs; but, if they succeed, the benefits are shared by all stockholders,
including those who were passive. Thus, it paid to be passive and "free ride"
on the activism of others. 175 This was especially true for index funds, which
176
compete by "keep[ing] expenses as low as possible. " The ability of proxy
advisors to help institutions become more assertive is evidenced by the
backlash from some guardians of CEO primacy who now advocate
restrictions on advisors. 177

173
Choi et a!., supra note 168, at 51-52; see also Santella et al., supra note 26, at 41
(concluding that "the voting of institutional investors is a collective process worked out by the voting
advice providers under the collective guidance of institutional investors that subscribe to their
services and interact with their voting advisors"). These conclusions belie some earlier fears that
proxy advisors recommendations were based on "Wall Street superstitions" and "cliches and myths,
rather than on genuine research." Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, Good Governance and the Misleading Jviyths
ofBad Metrics, 18 ACAD. OFMGMT.EXECUTIVE 108, 108 (2004).
174
See Choi et al., supra note 168, at 2, 7.
115
See Jolm C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable Are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CoRP. L. 837, 849 (1999) (stating that the two traditional collective action problems facing shareholders are "costs of communication, negotiation, and
coordination" and "free-riding"); Robert Monks & Allen Sykes, Capitalism Without Owners Will
Fail: A Policymaker's Guide to Refonn, 57 CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF FIN. INNOVATION 14 (2002)
("Passive institutions gain 95% or more of the benefit from any successful shareholder action at no
cost-and with a real chance of winning business away from the more activist group."); Shann
Turnbull, Invigorating Capitalism 4 (Aug. 2003) (6th lnt'l Conf. on Corp. Governance & Bd. Leadership Paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=437981 (stating that cost-benefit analysis, free
riders, and uncertain outcomes prompt "institutional shareholders to be 'reluctant,' apathetic or negligent in exercising their ownership rights").
176
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Breaking the Corporate Governance Logjam in Washington: Some
Constructive Thoughts on a Responsible Path Forward, 63 BUS. LAW. 1079, I 083 (2008).
177
See id. at 1084 n.l8 (proposing "prohibiting mutual and pension funds from utilizing
proxy voting recommendations services unless those services publicly disclose" specified information).

l
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There are also limits on what shareholders can do even if they muster
a majority. In Delaware, shareholders alone cannot amend the corporate
charter. 178 Shareholders who cooperate in activism can be deemed a
"group." If together they own over 5% of a company's stock, they all must
comply with the burdensome disclosure requirements of section 13(d) of the
Williams Act. 179 If they own over 10%, they can become subject to the
insider reporting and short-swing trading provisions of the Securities Exchange Act. 180 At higher levels of aggregate ownership, they may trigger
poison pills. 181
Although deterrents to shareholder activism have not vanished, other
developments are abetting activism. In addition to tacit cooperation through
proxy advisory services, the percentage of shares of public companies held
by institutions continues to grow. 182 The recent emergence of hedge funds is
also significant. They are more assertive than other shareholders because
they have fewer regulatory restrictions and have different incentive structures.183 "Hedge fund activism has resulted in an increased number of

178

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (2001) (requiring a board resolution before shareholder approval to amend the charter). The Model Business Corporation Act, which is followed in
many states, is the same. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § l 0.03 (2007). States that do allow the
shareholders to amend the charter sometimes require a supermajority vote to do so. See OHIO REV.
CODE ANN.§ 1701.71 (LexisNexis 2004) (requiring a two-thirds shareholder vote to amend the
charter).
179
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2006); see Black,
supra note 166, at 544 (discussing the deterrent effect of section 13(d)); John C. Coffee, Jr., The
SEC and the Institutionallnvestor: A Half- Time Report, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 837, 840-42 (1994).
180
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)-(b).
181
See Black, supra note 166, at 550-51 (describing the typical flip-in pill's ownership
threshold as between 10% and 20%).
182
In 1965, institutions owned 16% of U.S. equities; by 2001, they owned 61%. See SEC.
INDUS. ASS'N, SECURITIES INDUSTRY FACT BOOK 2002, at 66 (2002). More recently their
ownership passed 70%. See Duan, supra note 103, at 9.
183
See Clifford, supra note 81, at 3-5, 7-11, 30-31 (discussing the advantages of hedge
funds over other institutional investors); Zanoni, supra note 65, at 4-5 (describing the ability of
hedge funds to employ greater leverage, engage in short selling, and invest in illiquid assets). Robert
Illig ascribes the greater activism of hedge funds to greater compensation incentives for their
executives than for executives of other institutional investors. Robert C. [l[ig, What Hedge Funds
Can Teach Corporate America: A Roadmap for Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, 57 Arvl.
U. L. REV. 225, 231, 282-87 (2007). He suggests that the executives of mutual funds be granted
similar incentives to make these funds more assertive. !d. at 231,332-35. Hedge funds usually get a
percentage of the fund profits as "perfonnance fees." See Hennessee Group LLC, 13th Annual
Hedge Fund Manager Survey (2007), http://www .hennesseegroup.cornlinfonnation/index.html (last
visited Oct. 24, 2009) (charting performance fees of hedge funds). Hedge funds are also free of
some of the regulatory restrictions that apply to other investment companies. Private equity funds
also have performance fees labeled "carried interest." See Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, The
Economics ofPrivate Equity Funds, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. (forthcoming 2010)(manuscriptat4, 9-10,
30, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=996334); Ludovic Phalippou & Oliver Gottschalg, The
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184
election contests" for corporate boards.
Activist hedge funds often enlist
185
other institutions for joint action. Coordination of shareholders is further
abetted by the creation of the Investors for Director Accountability, which
intends to organize investors to "press directors to act in the interests of the
stockholders." 186
Some ground rules are also changing to the advantage of shareholders.
Traditionally, in board elections, seats were filled by the candidates receiveing the most votes, no matter how few those votes were. 187 Since the official
188
board nominees almost always run unopposed, they generally needed only
one vote each to prevail. Now, a growing number of companies are adopting
rules requiring a majority vote to elect directors. 189 This greatly increases the
ability of shareholders to remove unsatisfactory directors. The SEC's 1992
proxy rule changes also facilitate cooperation among share-holders. 190
The behavior of institutional investors shows that they particularly
value voting rights in certain situations. Mutual funds sometimes buy shares
of a company shortly before the record date and then vote against management.191 Investors dissatisfied with management can "exit" by selling their
stock, rather than "fight" by voting against management. However, when
ISS recommends a vote against management, mutual funds are much more
likely to vote against management than to sel1. 192 Mutual funds with large
holdings are also more likely to vote against management when their votes
Peiformance of Private Equity Funds, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1747, 1764-67 (2009); Charles F.
Beauchamp, Performance and Fee Structure Within the Private Equity Industry (Mar. 2007) (Middle
Tennessee State University Finance Presentation at the Financial Management Association 2007
Annual Meeting, on file with author).
184
Cboi et al., supra note 168 at 4.
185
See Briggs, supra note 61, at 691, 697-98, 721 (describing "wolf pack tactics"); Mara
Der Hovanesian, Attack of the Hungry Hedge Funds, Bus. WK., Feb. 20, 2006, at 72 (describing
coordinated efforts, including the seeking of board seats).
186
Gretchen Morgenson, Fund Manager, It's Time to Pick a Side, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26,
2006, § 3, at I. The organization has "urged investors to keep the heat on their companies' boards."
Gretchen Morgenson, Tao Many "No" Votes To Be Ignored, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 20,2009, § 3, at 1, 2
[hereinafter Morgenson, No Votes].
187
See Denise F. Brown, Updated Study Shows Majority Voting Being Adopted at "Breathtaking Speed," 5 BNA CORP. ACCOUNTABILITY REP. 190 (2007).
188
Proxy fights are extremely rare. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder
Access: A Response to the Business Roundtable, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 557, 559 (2005).
18
'13rown, supra note 187. This shows that "in the battle between owners and managers[,]
... investors are gaining power." Jena McGregor, Activist Investors Get More Respect, Bus. WK.,
June 11, 2007, at 34.
190
See Briggs, supra note 61, at 686-89; Coffee, supra note 179, at 840-41.
191
See Duan, supra note 103, at 4 ("Mutual funds are more likely to buy stock in younger,
growth firms (low book-to-market ratios) before the vote when they vote against management in
these fums. ").
192
See id. at 12, I 8. The tendency is especially strong for institutions with larger holdings.
ld. at 13.
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are more likely to alter the outcome. 193 In general, mutual funds have
become more active in their proxy voting. 194 Private equity and hedge funds
have stronger motives to raise share p1ice and, not surprisingly, are more
assertive than other institutional investors. 195
Support for shareholder proposals has grown, especially_ for those
opposing anti takeover devices. 196 More shareholder proposals are for binding bylaw amendments, rather than the traditional precatory requests. 197
There have been "more and more closely fought merger votes. "198 Such
behavior belies claims that shareholders prefer to be powerless and cede
control to directors they have not chosen. 199 Corporate boards are getting the
message and paying greater heed to successful shareholder resolutions. 200

193

See id. at 15.
See Daniel Gross, Some lvfutual Funds Are Joining the Activist Bandwagon, N.Y. TIMEs,
Jan. 15, 2006, § 3, at 5.
19
;See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
196
See Renneboog & Szilagyi, supra note 164, at 11 (presenting results of an empirical study
showing that average support rose from 28.7% in 1996 to 37.1% in 2005); see also Randall S.
Thomas & James F. Cotter, Shareholder Proposals in the New Millennium: Shareholder Support,
Board Response, and l'vfarket Reaction, !3 J. CORP. FIN. 368, 369, 377-78 (2007). "[P)roposals
targeting antitakeover devices achieved by far the most voting support at an average of53.4% of the
votes cast. In fact, ... 84% received majority support in 2005." Renneboog & Szilagyi, supra note
164, at 11. The number of annual proposals from 1996-2005 was also twice that for 1987-1994. !d.
at 10. Investors generally react favorably to shareholder proposals. See id. at 12 (documenting "significantly positive market reations"). Investors were also able to distinguish beneficial proposals
from others based on both the nature of the proponent and the subject matter ofthe proposal. See id.
at 13.
197
See Mark Maremont & Erin White, Stock Activism's Latest Weapon, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4,
2006, at Cl.
198
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1227, 1229 (2008). Even the number of "no" votes for corporate directors running unopposed
his increased. See Morgenson, No Votes, supra note 186.
199
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
200
A recent study of 620 nonbinding shareholder resolutions that obtained majority support
found that the rate of board implementation almost doubled after 2002, reaching more than 40%.
Y onca Ertimur eta!., Board ofDirectors' Responsiveness to Shareholders: Evidence from Shareholder Proposals, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 53 (2010). The study also found a lower likelihood of board
turnover at firms that implemented shareholder approved proposals. !d. at 54, 69. In another study,
of fifty companies where shareholders had approved a precatory proposal to declassify the board in
2004-2005, fifteen (30%) did:so, Ganor, supra note 162, at 158. More boards have bowed to shareholder demarids't~ eliminate poison pills despit~ management support for them. See Ali C. Akyol &
Carolyn A. Carroll, Removing Poison Pills: A Case of Shareholder Activism 9-13 (Sept. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=935950; see also Diane Del Guercio et
a!., Do Boards Pay Attention Wizen Institutional Investor Activists "Just Vote No?," 90 J. FIN.
ECON. 84, I 02 (2008) (finding, in an empirical study, that "just vote no" campaigns are "effective in
prodding boards to either fire an underperforrning CEO or to take other actions consistent with
shareholders' interests").
194
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Once more, exceptions prove the rule. Mutual funds and banks with
conflicts of interest (based on management of company pension funds) vote
more often with management. 201 If this is a problem, though, keeping
shareholders weak is not the solution. Sweetheart deals would be harder for
institutions to arrange if public companies were really directed by boards
chosen by the shareholders.
C. Shareholder Rights in General

If investors are conflicted or ignorant, or if they stress the short-term at
the expense oflong-term performance, corporations with weak shareholder
rights should outperform others. They do not. Firms with strong share202
holder rights are superior performers.
They also have more reasonable
203
executive compensation, less shareholder litigation/04 and invest more in
R&D. 205 Analysts sometimes give higher ratings to firms with strong share06
holder rights? Many institutional investors consider firms' governance in
their investment decisions and work to strengthen shareholder rights in
207
individual firms.
Again, all this behavior contradicts the charge that
investors choose to be weak in corporate governance.

201

See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
These firms have better operating performance and higher share prices. See supra notes
92-95 and accompanying text. Higher shareholder monitoring is associated with increased
innovation. See generally Haresh Sapra et al., Cmporate Governance and Innovation: Them)' and
Evidence l-4 (Univ. of Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 08-05, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=Il 03676. Strong shareholder rights are associated with more successful
acquisitions. See Cong Wang & Fei Xie, Cmporate Governance Transfer and Synergistic Gains
from Mergers and Acquisitions, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 829, 840-42 (2009). The benefits of strong
shareholder rights are greater among companies with high free cash flow. See Jianxin Daniel Chi &
D. Scott Lee, The Conditional Nature of the Value ojC01porate Governance, 34 J. BANKING &
FIN. 350, 360 (2010) ("[W]hen free cash flow is high, firm value is significantly enhanced by
improvements in governance quality.").
203
See Pomsit Jiraporn ·et al., CEO Compensation, Shareholder Rights, and Cmporate
Governance: An Empirical Investigation, 29 J. ECON. &FIN. 242, 243 (2005); Daines et al., supra
note 78, at 17; see also Angela Andrews et al., Corporate Governance and Executive Perquisites:
Evidence from the New SEC Disclosure Rules 22-23 (Mar. 17, 2009) (AAA 2009 Fin. Acct. &
Reporting Section (FARS) Paper), m1ailable at http://ssm.com/abstract=1268087 (presenting results
of an empirical study fmding that firms with weak corporate governance are more likely to award
perquisites to executives).
204
See George Kaltchev, Corporate Governance and Shareholder Litigation (Dec. 1, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1309555 (finding, in an empirical
study, that stronger shareholder rights are associated with less shareholder litigation).
205
See supra notes 123-37.
206
See Au tore et al., supra note 92, at 7; see also id. at 24 (providing a table with descriptive
statistics).
207
A recent study fmds that "approximately 10 percent of institutions [examined] are
202
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VI. COMPAREDTOWHAT?:
IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Parts III through V of this article discussed whether shareholders of
public companies are knowledgeable and unified behind the goal of
maximizing long-term share value or, on the contrary, uninformed and
deeply divided. The discussion found the former to be true, but that
discussion is peppered with words like "generally," "usually," "typically,"
and notes numerous exceptions. Even if one accepts the analysis there, what
are its implications for corporate governance? Since shareholder unity and
understanding are imperfect, should true shareholder governance be
rejected?
Not necessarily. The proper question is not whether shareholder
primacy is perfect-obviously it is not-but whether it is better than any
208
altemative.
Most public companies are now dominated by their CEOs.
As Berle and Means noted long ago, CEOs who control tend to elevate their
own interests over the shareholders' interest. 209 The effects of this dominance-including bloated executive compensation, retention of unprofitable
operations, empire building through wasteful acquisitions, and manipulation
of financial disclosure-are well documented? 10
sensitive to each set of governance mechanisms" out of several posited. Brian J. Bushee et al.,
Institutional Investor Preferences for Corporate Governance Mechanisms 21 (Mar. 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=I070168. The study also finds
evidence "implying that these institutions engage in shareholder activism." !d. at 3; see also Kee H.
Chung & Hao Zhang, Corporate Governance and Institutional Ownership, 45 1. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 6, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1409222) (empirical study finding that "institutional investors' gravitation to stocks of companies
that have better governance structure is likely to be stronger than that of individual investors").
108
Cf Bebchuk, supra note 96, at 1803 ("The choice is between giving shareholders power
to influence the rules of the game and maintaining boards' indefinite control over these rules.").
109
See BERLE & MEANS, supra note I, at 197-201.
110
See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text; see also Ole-Kristian Hope & Wayne B.
Thomas, Managerial Empire Building and Firm Disclosure, 46 1. ACCT. RES. 591, 622 (2008)
(finding that unconstrained managers make self-maximizing decisions, including value-reducing
expansions of the firm); Wruck, supra note 130, at 10 (stating that corporate managers frequently
focus "on growth and diversification, often at the expense of profitability and value"). The costs of
poor corporate governance are immense. See Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and
Equity Prices, I 18 Q.J. ECON. 107, 145 (2003) (stating that gains from improved corporate governance "would be enormous"); Morgenson, No Votes, supra note I 86, at 2 (quoting money manager
and investor activist Frederick E. Rowe as estimating that "the excess costs associated with
management compensation, Wall Street fees and political expenditures reduce investor returns about
3 percent on average every year"). For a discussion on market reactions to diversifYing mergers, see
Philip G. Berger & Eli Ofek, Diversification's Effect on Finn Value, 37 I. FIN. ECON. 39 (1995);
Robert Comment & Gregg A. Jarrell, Corporate Focus and Stock Returns, 37 I. FIN. ECON. 67, 68
(I995); Lany H.P. Lang & Rene M. Stulz, Tobin's q, Corporate Diversification, and Firm Performance, 102 I. POL. ECON. 1248, 1277-78 (1994).
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For decades there have been efforts to curb CEOs by infusing boards
of directors-the ostensible governing bodies-with independence. Despite
some claims to the contrary,m these efforts have failed. 212 CEOs always
influence, and often dominate, the selection of outside directors. 213 Naturally
they prefer candidates who look kindly on high executive compensation and
214
perquisites and on managerial self-dealing.
Many outside directors them215
selves have conflicts of interest.
CEOs also control the infonnation
received by outside directors? 16 The CEO can curry their favor in various

211

See STEPHEN M. BAINBRJDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE lN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 155-200 (2008) (claiming that outside directors effectively monitor the CEO and each
other and exercise real control).
212
"The most significant problem facing corporate America today is the management-dominated, passive board of directors." Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the ManagementCaptured Board-The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127, 127 (1996); see
also Coates, supra note 175, at 847 ("Both theoretical and empirical reasons exist to believe that
boards of a substantial minority, and perhaps a substantial majority, of U.S. public corporations are
dominated by managers."); Glyn A. Holton,lnvestor Szd.j'i·age Movement, 62 FlN. ANALYSTS J. 15,
19-20 (2006) (stating that "[r]ecent market crashes and financial scandals are symptomatic of a
capitalism in which shareholders have lost control over the corporations they own," and urging the
implementation of measures to make shareholder voting more effective); Lin, supra note 92, at 898903, 9!3-17 (cataloging the many ways that CEOs dominate outside directors); Romano, supra note
117, at 192 ("[F]inns whose boards have a majority of independent directors ... do not perform
significantly better than those whose boards ... have fewer outside directors."); James Surowiecki,
Board Stiff, NEW YORKER, June I, 2009, at 34 ("All these changes [in board composition], though,
have had a much smaller impact than expected."). Sophisticated investors realize this. See Rachel
McTague, Advisers, High-Net-Worth Investors Think Boards Serve Executives, Survey Says, 39
BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1662, 1662 (2007) ("A survey of more than 200 investment advisers and
high-net-worth investors found that the respondents clearly perceive that corporate boards primarily
answer to management, rather than shareholders.").
213
See MONKS & MJNOW, supra note 159, at 193 (noting that "in 1991 [,] ... 82 percent of
board vacancies were filled via recommendations from the chainnan," who is also usually the CEO);
see also Carl T. Bogus, Excessive Executive Compensation and the Failure of Corporate Democracy, 41 BUFF. L. REV. I, 34 (1993) (finding in a small survey of the 500 largest companies in 1989
that "the CEO initially recommended 90-100% of all directoral nominees"); Kevin F. Hallock,
Reciprocally Interlocking Boards ofDirectors and Executive Compensation, 32 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 331, 332 (1997) (stating that CEOs often choose new directors); Benjamin E.
Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 96, 96-97 (1998) (stating that CEOs choose or approve of
board nominees).
214
See Dent, supra note 121, at 1241 and authorities cited therein.
215
See id. at 1242-43. For example, many directors who satisfy current rules of independence because they have neither financial nor familial ties to the CEO or to the firm still have
social ties to the CEO, and these ties seem to undermine board independence. See Byoung-Hyoun
Hwang & Seoyoung Kim, It Pays to Have Friends, 93 J. FJN. ECON. 138, 145 (2009) (finding that
boards that were socially as well as conventionally independent, inter alia, awarded significantly
lower levels of compensation and showed stronger pay-performance sensitivity than boards lacking
such independence).
216
See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL
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ways and can tlrreaten to remove uncooperative members. The CEO (who
is almost always a director) and her allies on the board can seize the board's
initiative, and "groupthink" discourages anyone inclined to oppose them. 218
Further efforts to ensure board independence are probably doomed to failure
because of the boards' "unique susceptibility to capture by the managers they
are supposed to monitor." 219
The repeated failures of outside board majorities to curb CEO
autocracy have led to repeated tightening of the definition of director
independence in the hope that this will finally achieve the desired result.
This strategy is doomed to defeat. The law can exclude directors who have
certain affiliations that could negate independence, but that does not
guarantee that the board will act diligently to maximize share value. CEOs
have twisted the outsider board, which is intended to restrain them, into a
tool for increasing their power. One tactic is the growth of interlocking
220
directorates, where CEOs sit on each other's boards. Similarly, the use of
ANALYSIS 144 (1976) (stating that "the board must rely on the executives" to provide them with
information).
217
See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda
for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 874-75 ( 1991) (stating that dissident directors
were often not renominated).
218
"Groupthink" is the tendency of members of a group to "adopt[] the goals and methods of
the group uncritically." Stephen J. Choi, Behavioral Economics and the Regulation ofPublic Offerings, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 85, 124 (2006); see also James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger,
Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications ofCorporate Cohesion,
48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 83-84, 99-l 08 (I 985) (describing bases of ingroup biases among
directors); Robert J. Haft, Business Decisions by the New Board: Behavioral Science and Corporate Law, 80 MICH. L. REv. l, 37-43 (1981) (discussing board conformity); Renee M. Jones, Law,
Norms, and the Breakdown ofthe Board: Promoting Accountability in Corporate Governance, 92
IOWA L. REv. 105, 139-41 (2006) (discussing board conformity); James D. Westphal & Poonam
Khanna, Keeping Directors in Line: Social Distancing as a Control Mechanism in the Corporate
Elite, 48 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 361, 362-63, 367-71 (2003 )(showing that dissident directors are subjected
to shunning). In general, "the very things that make people likely to join a board-connections,
business experience, sociability-are also the things that make them less effective once they do."
James Surowiecki, The Sky-High Club, NEW YORKER, Jan. 22,2007, at 32; see also Antony Page,
Unconscious Bias and the Limits of Director Independence, 2009 U. ILL. L. REv. 237, 248-51
(discussing the inevitable cognitive bias of even ostensibly independent directors).
219
MACEY, supra note 81, at 57.
220
Some years ago it was reported that CEOs of other companies comprised about 63% of
outside directors. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 217, at 875. "These directors are unlikely to
monitor more energetically than they believe they should be monitored by their own boards." !d.
These current and former CEOs now comprise a network. See Ernie Englander & Allen Kaufinan,
Sarbanes-Oxley and the New Corporate Governance in the United States 6-7 (Mar. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=l 030804 ("The corporate sector established
a private independent interlocking network in response to regulatory threats for increased federal
oversight," and "[t]he Business Roundtable ... has used the independent director to protect managerial discretion."). Further, "[t]o articulate their collective concerns on public policy matters,
including those that directly affect corporate director duties, the directorship requires a public, a
collective voice. The directorship currently relies structurally on The Business Roundtable (BRT)."
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independent compensation committees and consultants, which was intended
to institute real pay for performance, has been twisted into another ploy for
further inflating already bloated CEO compensation. 221 Tightening the
criteria for director independence may actually be damaging to corporate
governance by excluding "inforined and interested outside directors with
significant equity stakes" 222 at a time when "firms are becoming more

I d. at 5. Interlocking boards are associated with lower stock prices and sub-optimal sensitivity of
CEO compensation to performance. See Erik Devos et al., Are Interlocked Directors Effective
Monitors? 33 (Jan. 15, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract
=1 084117; Olubunmi Faleye, CEO Directors, Executive Incentives, and Corporate Strategic Initiatives I (July 25, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1184342
(finding that "shareholders incur significant costs when other CEOs serve on the board"); see also
Hallock, supra note 213, at 332.
221
See, e.g., Kevin J. Murphy & Tatiana Sandino, Executive Pay and "Independent" Compensation Consultants (Marshall Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. FBE 10-09, 2009), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract= 1148991 (empirical study fmding that executive pay is higher in companies ·
where the consulting firm also provides other services); see also James D. Cox, Fair Pay for Chief
Executive Officers, in LAW AND CLASS IN AMERICA: TRENDS SINCE Tiffi COlD WAR 99, 106 (P.D.
Carrington & T. Jones eds., 2006) ("The role of the compensation consultant is fraught with
conflicting interests."); Eric M. Fogel & Andrew M. Geier, Strangers in the House: Rethinking
Sarbanes-Oxley and the Independent Board of Directors, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 63-64 (2007)
("[M]anagers use the compensation consultants as 'camouflage' to extract premium rents from the
compensation committee."); Gretchen Morgenson, Corporate America's Pay Pal, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 15, 2006, § 3, at 1 (chronicling how one consulting firm repeatedly boosted executive
compensation for more than 1,800 clients); Gretchen Morgenson, Outside Advice on Boss's Pay
May Not Be So Independent, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2006, at AI (discussing the "long and lucrative
relationship" between one executive-compensation consulting firm and its client).
As for compensation committees of the board, Warren buffet calls them "tail-wagging
puppy dogs." See Surowiecki, supra note 218, at 32. Most boards want the CEO to be in the top
half of the CEO peer group because they think it makes the company look strong. This attitude, of
course, propels an endless upward spiral in CEO pay. See Scott Schaefer & Rachel M. Hayes, CEO
Pay and the Lake Wobegon Effect, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 280 (2009) (employing a game-theoretic
model); see also POSNER, supra note 140, at 93-94 (explaining how relations among managers,
outside directors, and compensation consultants tend to inflate executive compensation); Maria
Bartiromo, Facetime, Bus. WK., Mar. 2, 2009, at 15, 16 (interview with Nell Minow who says of
the role of compensation committees in the explosion of executive compensation: "I absolutely
blame them 100%").
222
Haarmeyer, supra note 130, at 260 (naming the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and stock exchange
listing rules as culprits); see also Masulis & Thomas, supra note 130, at 246 ("'[I]ndependent'
directors may ... lack the knowledge and appropriate skill set to engage in effective risk monitoring."); Simon C.Y. Wong, Uses and Limits of Conventional Corporate Governance Instruments:
Analysis and Guidance for Reform (Integrated Version) 1 (Aug. 2003) (Private Sector Opinion,
Global Corp. Governance Forum, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1409370 ("In the
financial sector, the shift toward a board dominated by independent directors ... ultimately proved
to be its Achilles' heel as weak industry knowledge meant that non-executive directors were unable
to pick up on warning signs of imprudent risk taking by management."). Note that private companies do use directors who are experts and might not qualify as "independent" for public companies. See Oesterle, supra note 128, at 64.
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complex (geographically and technologically) and bigger, making them more
difficult to monitor. "223
These forces are formidable, but they still would not thwart outsiders
comprising a majority (as they do on most boards) if the outsiders were
motivated to take control and maximize share value. Sadly, there is little
incentive for them to do so. Shareholders may grumble, but, except in the
rare case of a serious proxy fight for control,224 they can do little to punish
CEO lap dogs on the board or to reward directors who do fight for the
shareholders. The usual obstacles shareholders face, if they attempt a proxy
fight, can be significantly bolstered by "staggered boards," where only onethird of the directors are elected each year, so that insurgents must win at
least two consecutive proxy fights, rather than one, to gain board control.
This situation heightens directors' realization that shareholders cannot punish
them for kowtowing to the CE0. 225
The secret backdating and "spring-loading" of stock options by
thousands of companies shows that CEO dominance has not abated and may
226
have worsened.
These incidents are particularly distressing because CEOs
and directors not only padded executive compensation, but deliberately
deceived investors in order to do so. Not surprisingly, the stock market took

113

Masulis & Thomas, supra note 130, at 245. They state further:
[T]he growing use of, and trading in, derivative instruments by corporations ...
has increased the importance of attracting fmancially sophisticated, highly
motivated corporate directors, who can deliver intensive monitoring of corporate
risk management strategies, who are capable of independently and effectively
controlling firm management to regulate derivative exposure, and who set senior
management financial incentives to ensure that these executives' [incentives] ...
are aligned with those affirm owners.
!d. at 220.
114
See Bebchuk, supra note 188, at 559 (presenting data showing that proxy fights are rare).
mNot surprisingly, then, staggered boards are associated with lower stock prices. See supra
note 163 and accompanying text.
226
See Jesse M. Fried, Option Backdating and Its Implications, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
853, 886 (2008) ("Secret backdating ... provides further support for the view that managerial power
has played an important role in shaping executive compensation arrangements."). '"Spring-loading'
describes the practice where a corporate executive receives stock options shortly before the release of
favorable company news that is expected to raise the company's stock price." Matthew E. Orso,
Comment, "Spring-Loading" Executive Stock Options: An Abuse in Need ofa Federal Remedy, 53
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 629, 631 (2009). The practice does not seem to be uncommon. See David
Yerrnack, Higher k!arket Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors, 40 1. FrN.
ECON. 185 (I 996); see also Lucian Bebchuk eta!., Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors (May 2009)
(unpublished manuscript) (ftnding that an unusually large number of stock options have been
granted at the stock's lowest price in the month of the grant). It is unclear whether the practice is
illegal, but the ability of executives to profit from events that have already occurred, but have not yet
been publicly disclosed, clearly contradicts the premise that executive stock options are granted to
give managers an incentive to work hard to raise the company's stock price.
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this news badly. 227 More generally, there may actually be a negative
correlation between the ratio of outside directors on a company's board and
the value of its stock. 228
Despite the persistence of CEO domination and its damage to
investors, some commentators feel that shareholders have become too
powerful and their rights should be curtailed. Delaware's Vice Chancellor
Leo Strine, for example, wants to deny voting rights altogether to stockholders who have held their shares for less than a year or who seek
con tro 1. 229
Tinkering with the rules for shareholder voting will accomplish
little. 230 Matters would be different if boards were actually chosen by
shareholders. Directors then would know that they would be rewarded if
they effectively represent the shareholders, and dismissed if they did not. 231
If shareholders chose boards, the rewards to able directors would include a
reputation that could lead to further and more lucrative directorships.
The disempowerment of shareholders is now a threat to America's
ability to attract investment capital. Investors care about shareholder rights
and try to improve them in other countries. 232 Investor protection is

127

See Gennaro Bernile & Gregg A. Jarrell, The Impact of the Options Backdating Scandal
on Shareholders (June 1, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=97113 7 (study showing that stocks of firms accused of backdating experienced major losses). The
damage to shareholders far exceeded the benefits to executives. See M.P. Narayanan et al., The
Economic impact of Backdating of Executive Stock Options, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1597, 1600-01
(2007) (finding that the average loss per firm to shareholders was about $3 89 million while the
average potential gain to all the optionees in each firm was under $500,000).
128
See Y ermack, supra note 226 (noting an inverse relationship between board size and firm
value).
229
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the
Shared Interests ofA1anogers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33
J. CORP. L. I, 15 (2007).
230
See MACEY, supra note 81, at 199 ("[l]t is irrational in my view to think that expanding
shareholder voting can possibly improve the daily governance and operation of a large public
corporation.").
231
See George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 881, 907-11 (proposal for shareholders to choose directors); see also
Zingales, supra note 1OJ, at 414 ("[I]t is necessary to allow institutional investors to propose their
own slate of directors."); Surowiecki, supra note 212 ("Investors need to be able to play a much
bigger role in determining who ends up on boards.").
232
See Reena Aggarwal et al., Does Governance Travel Around the World? Evidence fi·om
institutional Investors 4, 3 I (Fisher Coli. of Bus. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 200903-008, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=J361143 (finding a "strong positive relation
between firn1-level governance and institutional ownership" and that "institutional investors promote
good governance practices ... around the world"); see also supra note 207 (citing studies finding
that institutional investors care about the quality of corporate governance in American companies).
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associated with higher economic growth. 233 Many foreign countries now
have stronger shareholder rights than America does. 234 This fact may
explain why American executives receive higher compensation than their
foreign counterparts. 235 Rupert Murdoch even shifted the incorporation of
News Corp. from Australia to Delaware in order to escape the stronger
shareholder rights provided by the former. 236 The Committee on Capital
Markets Regulation (the "Paulson Committee") concluded that "[o]verall,
shareholders of U.S. companies have fewer rights ... than do their foreign

233
Rui Castro et al., Investor Protection, Optimal Incentives, and Economic Growth, 119
Q.J. ECON. 1131, 1131-35, 1166-67 (2004); Binyamin Berdugo & Sharon Hadad, How Does Investors' Legal Protection Affect Productivity and Growth? l-3, 28, 30, 32-33 (May 21, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=l412324 (showing that better investors'
legal protection expands the range of high-tech projects that can be fmanced by non-bank investors
and enhances productivity and economic growth).
234
See Bebchuk, supra note 155, at 848 ("[T]he corporate law system of the United States
... stands out among the corporate law systems of developed countries in how far it goes to restrict
shareholder initiative and intervention."); Fairfax, supra note 90, at 12-13 (stating that most other
developed nations require a majority vote for director elections rather than a plurality vote, as in the
United States); Jennifer G. Hill, Regulatory Show and Tell: Lessons from International Statutmy
Regimes, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 829 & n.66 (2008) (stating that laws in the United Kingdom and
Australia now require an annual shareholder vote on executive pay); Priya P. Lele & Mathias M.
Siems, Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric Approach, 7 J. CORP. L. STUD. 17 (2007) (finding
that U.S. law on shareholder protection was weakest of five countries studied); Brett H. McDonnell,
Professor Bainbridge and the Arrowian lvfoment: A Review ofThe New Corporate Governance in
Theory and Practice, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 139, 183 (2009) (stating that "[s]ome of the key rules
favoring director primacy ... in American, and especially Delaware, corporate law do not exist in
other countries"); Arthur R. Pinto, The European Union's Shareholder Voting Rights Directive from
an American Perspective: Some Comparisons and Observations, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 587, 61213 (2008) (stating that shareholders in EU nations now have broader rights than do shareholders in
America to call shareholder meetings and to place items on the agenda for shareholder meetings);
Gretchen Morgenson, Belated Apologies in Proxy Land, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2006, § 3, at 7
(quoting a British investment manager as saying, "globally, the U.S. is probably one of the most
difficult environments to work in"); Jennifer G. Hill, The Shifting Balance of Power Between
Shareholders and the Board: News Corp's Exodus to Delaware and Other Antipodean Tales 14-16
(Univ. of Sydney, Sydney Law Sch., Research Paper No. 08/20, 2008) [hereinafter Hill, Shifting
Balance], available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 10864 77 (describing greater shareholder rights in the
United Kingdom and Australia, e.g., poison pills are illegal in Australia); Simon C.Y. Wong, Shareholder-Company Engagement: A Comparative Overview, 60 (International Corporate Governance
Network Yearbook), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=l490724 (reporting that engagement
between boards and shareholders is much greater in several other countries than in the United
States).
135
See Nuno Fernandes et al., The Pay Divide: (Why) Are U.S. Top Executives Paid More?
2-3 (ECGI, Fin. Working Paper No. 255/2009, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=l341639
(failing to find any fmn-level explanation for the "pay premium" received by U.S. CEOs, the authors
positing that the explanation is country-specific).
236
See Hill, Shifting Balance, supra note 234, at 26-45; see also Mathias M. Siems,
Shareholder Protection Around the World (Leximetric II), 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. Ill, Ill, 113, 144
(2008) (describing improvement in shareholder protections in many countries).
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competitors" and that this situation was impairing investment in the United
States. 237 It recommended strengthening shareholder rights in several
respects. 238
Human beings are imperfect. No system that depends on them can be
perfect; some people will always contrive to game every system. Accordingly, nomination of directors of public companies by a committee of the ten
to twenty largest shareholders will not prove flawless, but that is no reason to
reject it. The question is whether it is likely to work better than any alternative. It definitely should be superior to the dysfunctional status quo, and I
am not aware of any different proposal for a new system that would be
preferable.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The separation of ownership and control publicized by Berle and
Means in 1932 persists today. Domination of public companies by selfserving and ineffective executives costs America billions of dollars every
year and contributed to the current economic meltdown. Various efforts to
resolve this problem-including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, expanded disclosure duties, and more stringent requirements for director independencehave had little benefit and occasionally have made matters worse.
Proposals for greater shareholder power, however, have encountered
criticisms: various shareholders have conflicting goals; shareholders favor a
short-term perspective at the expense of the long-term health of companies;
and shareholders lack the knowledge needed to play a positive leading role
in corporate governance. Evidence demolishes these charges. With minor
exceptions that could be handled by narrow rules, shareholders are
remarkably united in their desire to maximize share value, which is also
generally the best measure of the long-tenn health of a corporation. A
critical mass of investors also has the sophistication needed to contribute

237

1NTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMIITEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION I 6 (2006)
[hereinafter INTERIM REPORT), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/I I .30Committee_
Interim_ReportREV2.pdf. The connection is logical: "foreigners invest less in firms that reside in
countries with poor outsider protection and disclosure and have ownership structures that are conducive to governance problems." Christian Leuz et al., Do Foreigners Invest Less in Poor(v Govemed Finns?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3245 (2009); see also Randall K. Morek & Lloyd Steier, The
Global Hist01y of Corporate Governance: An Introduction 40 (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. WII062, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=652361 ("Financial
development seems intimately tied to corporate governance.").
238
1NTERIM REPORT, supra note 237, at xiii, 5. It proposed, among other things, that "any
policy proposal should adopt as a default the option most favorable to shareholders, given the
fundamental asymmetry of power between managers and shareholders." Id. at 103.
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beneficially to corporate governance. Strong shareholder rights and share. holder activism are strongly associated with better results in myriad ways.
The damage to America's economy from the continuing emasculation
of shareholders of American public companies is growing. Capital is increasingly mobile, and America's status as the safest locus of investment is
eroding as many foreign countries now offer shareholders better protection.
Tired of the abuse they suffer here, investors are gradually taking the funds
needed to finance American growth and depositing them abroad.
Fortunately, this trend can be quickly reversed. The costs of CEO
domination can easily be stemmed by enhancing shareholder power. Views
differ about how best to do that, and no single reform is likely to be the
magic bullet that solves all corporate governance problems forever;
important policy initiatives always tum out to have imperfections requiring
further adjustments. The general direction for change, however, is clear.
The critiques of shareholder power are wrong; a better economy requires
greater shareholder power.

